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1. Thematischer Rahmen 
1.1 Unternehmensberichterstattung und Nachhaltigkeit 
Die externe Berichterstattung von Unternehmen unterliegt einem stetigen Wandel. Dieser 
betrifft zum einen die klassische Finanzberichterstattung, in der eine zunehmende Regelungs-
dichte zu neuen und geänderten Offenlegungspflichten beiträgt. Dabei wirken internationale 
Konvergenzbestrebungen dem heterogenen Bild nationaler Rechnungslegungsstandards ent-
gegen (FASB, 2014).1 Gleichzeitig werden die Unternehmen mit sich wandelnden nationalen 
handelsrechtlichen Vorschriften2, börsenspezifischen Kotierungsreglementen3 sowie länder-
spezifischen Richtlinien etwa zur Corporate Governance4 konfrontiert. Zum anderen führt die 
zunehmend internationale Tätigkeit von Unternehmen zur Globalisierung von aus Unterneh-
menssicht externen Effekten, die sich auf eine Vielzahl von Gesellschaftsgruppen sowohl 
positiv als auch negativ auswirken können (Coase, 1960; Pigou, 1932). Das Bewusstwerden 
über die komplexe Problematik solcher Wechselwirkungen induzierte einen internationalen 
Reflexionsprozess darüber, ob und inwieweit zum Gesamtwohl der Gesellschaft zusätzliche 
Anstrengungen zur stärkeren Berücksichtigung von Externalitäten in unternehmerischen Ent-
scheidungsprozessen notwendig sind. Mit der weit gefassten Definition von nachhaltiger 
Entwicklung als “development [that] seeks to meet the needs and aspirations of the present 
without compromising the ability to meet those of the future” (United Nations, 1987, Teil I, 
Kapitel 1, Absatz 49) wird deutlich, dass eine nachhaltige Unternehmensführung kurz- und 
langfristige externe Effekte umfassend einbeziehen und wo nötig steuern muss. Aus diesem 
übergeordneten Zusammenhang leitet sich für die Berichterstattung der Unternehmen ab, dass 
ausgehend von der klassischen Finanzberichterstattung eine Erweiterung notwendig ist. Es 
sind zusätzliche Informationen offenzulegen, die den individuellen Beitrag eines Unterneh-
mens zu einer breit verstandenen Nachhaltigkeit aufzeigen. So können nicht nur die Informa-
tionsbedürfnisse der von externen Effekten betroffenen Interessengruppen befriedigt werden, 
sondern es entstehen gleichzeitig Anreize für die Unternehmen, sich mit dem Thema Nachhal-
tigkeit neu auseinanderzusetzen. Als Ergebnis wurden den Stakeholdern5 von Unternehmen 
erstmals in den 1970er Jahren speziell aufgearbeitete Informationen über die sozialen und 
umweltbezogenen Auswirkungen der Unternehmensaktivitäten bereitgestellt (Fifka, 2012). 
Nach einer Entwicklungszeit von rund 40 Jahren ist heute zumindest für internationale Gross-
unternehmen eine umfassende Nachhaltigkeitsberichterstattung “undeniably a mainstream 
global business practice” (KPMG, 2013, S. 22). 
                                                 
1 Vgl. zum Stand der nationalen IFRS-Adaption IASB (2014), PricewaterhouseCoopers (2014) und Deloitte 
(2014). 
2 Vgl. zum Beispiel das Deutsche Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz vom 25. Mai 2009 oder das revidierte 
Schweizer Rechnungslegungsrecht, welches am 1. Januar 2013 in Kraft getreten ist. 
3 Vgl. zum Beispiel für Deutschland Deutsche Börse (2014) und für die Schweiz SIX Swiss Exchange (2014). 
4 Vgl. die Comply-or-explain-Richtlinien des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex in der Fassung vom 24. 
Juni 2014 in Verbindung mit § 161 AktG sowie den Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance in 
der Fassung vom 28. August 2014. 
5 Freeman (1984, S. 25) definiert Stakeholder als “groups […] that can affect, or are affected by, the accom-
plishment of organizational purpose”. 
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1.2 Forschungsgebiete 
Parallel zu den Entwicklungen in der Unternehmenspraxis hat sich rund um die Nachhaltig-
keitsberichterstattung ein Fundus an Forschungsarbeiten entwickelt, der sich in drei For-
schungsgebiete untergliedern lässt. Das Forschungsgebiet I umfasst Arbeiten, die sich mit der 
Operationalisierung von Nachhaltigkeit beschäftigen. Es geht um die Fragen, was Nachhal-
tigkeit im Unternehmenskontext konkret bedeutet und anhand welcher Indikatoren die Nach-
haltigkeit eines Unternehmens beurteilt werden kann. Im Report der Vereinten Nationen von 
1987 wird neben der Definition von nachhaltiger Entwicklung auch die Bedeutung der Wirt-
schaft und somit einzelner Unternehmen bei der Entstehung und Lösung globaler Probleme, 
wie zum Beispiel dem Klimawandel, der Energie- und Nahrungsversorgung, Ressourcen-
knappheit, Gesundheit, Bildung und dem Schutz von Ökosystemen, beschrieben (United Na-
tions, 1987). Auf Basis dieser breiten Grundlage werden verschiedene theoretische Nachhal-
tigkeitskonzepte diskutiert (Marshall & Toffel, 2005), wobei die breiteste Akzeptanz dem 
Triple-Bottom-Line-Ansatz zugesprochen werden kann (Marquis & Toffel, 2011). Nach 
diesem Konzept umfasst unternehmerische Nachhaltigkeit die drei Bereiche Ökonomie, Öko-
logie und Soziales (Elkington, 1997). Bei der Gewichtung dieser Bereiche kann zwischen 
einem schwachen und starken Nachhaltigkeitsverständnis unterschieden werden, je nach dem 
ob die Summe aller drei substituierbaren Bereiche mindestens konstant bleibt (schwach) oder 
ob dabei zusätzlich nur regenerative ökologische Ressourcen verbraucht werden (stark) (Ott 
& Döring, 2008). Da Unternehmen ohne eine stabile ökonomische Grundlage auf Dauer ihrer 
ökologischen und sozialen Verantwortung nicht nachkommen können, sehen Kritiker des 
Triple-Bottom-Line-Ansatzes die Gefahr, dass einzelne Unternehmen in der Triple-Bottom-
Line eine “good old-fashioned single bottom line plus vague commitments to social and en-
vironmental concerns” (Norman & MacDonald, 2004, S. 256) sehen könnten. Aus Sicht der 
Unternehmen wandelt sich die Bedeutung der drei Dimensionen zunehmend in Richtung eines 
interdependenten und integrativen Verständnisses. Während in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren 
der Terminus Sozialbericht verbreitet war, dominierten in den 1990er Jahren Umweltberichte 
und in den 2000er Jahren die Termini (sozialer) Verantwortungsbericht und Nachhaltigkeits-
bericht (Fifka, 2012). In jüngster Zeit werden Nachhaltigkeitsberichte vermehrt anstelle einer 
separaten Veröffentlichung in den Jahresbericht integriert, was die Zunahme der ihnen zuge-
messenen Bedeutung unterstreicht (KPMG, 2013). 
Das theoretisch und praktisch weiterhin uneinheitliche Verständnis von unternehmerischer 
Nachhaltigkeit setzt sich bei der Messung der Nachhaltigkeitsperformance und der Beurtei-
lung von Quantität sowie Qualität der Nachhaltigkeitsberichterstattung fort. Die ökonomische 
Dimension der Nachhaltigkeitsperformance lässt sich auch als finanzielle Unternehmensper-
formance interpretieren (Wood, 2010), zu deren Messung sich beispielsweise Aktien- und 
Eigenkapitalrenditen oder Ergebnisgrössen verwenden lassen (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Ullmann, 
1985). Während sich solche Masse auf direkt beobachtbare Resultate beziehen, wird im Be-
reich der sozialen und ökologischen Dimension auch die Berücksichtigung indirekt beobacht-
barer Anstrengungen der Unternehmen diskutiert. Hierunter fallen die Prinzipien der Unter-
nehmensführung und die Ausgestaltung von nachhaltigkeitsbezogenen internen Prozessen 
(Wood, 1991). Die in empirischen Studien verwendeten Messkonzepte sind breit gefächert 
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und decken je nach Studie direkte, indirekte oder gemischte Performancemasse ab, wobei die 
benötigten Daten unter anderem aus den Nachhaltigkeitsberichten der Unternehmen erhoben 
werden können. Beispiele für direkte Masse sind normalisierte Mengen oder Recyclingraten 
giftiger Abfälle und giftiger Emissionen generell (Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 
2004; Clarkson et al., 2008; Clarkson et al., 2011; Patten, 2002). Ausserdem kommen Ran-
kings zum Einsatz, die mehrere direkte Umweltparameter aggregieren (Cho et al., 2012). Als 
gemischte Performancemasse werden weitere Rankings verwendet, die sowohl direkte Emis-
sionswerte als auch teilweise Prinzipien und Prozesse sowie nachhaltigkeitsbezogene Stärken 
und Schwächen berücksichtigen (Ingram & Frazier, 1980; Wiseman, 1982; Rockness, 1985; 
Fekrat et al., 1996; Hughes et al., 2001; Cho et al., 2006; Cho & Patten, 2007; de Villiers & 
van Staden, 2011). Weiterhin kommen die Industriegruppe und die Meldung von Emissionen 
an öffentliche Stellen als Proxies zum Einsatz (Bewley & Li, 2000). 
Bei der Messung der Nachhaltigkeitsberichterstattung stehen die Fragen im Mittelpunkt, wie 
und im Vergleich zu welcher Benchmark die Quantität und Qualität der veröffentlichten In-
formationen bewertet werden können. Bei den berichtenden Unternehmen haben sich die 
Leitlinien zur Berichterstattung der Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) durchgesetzt (Hoff-
mann, 2011; KPMG, 2013). Gemäss GRI umfasst die Nachhaltigkeitsberichterstattung “the 
practice of measuring, disclosing, and being accountable to internal and external stakeholders 
for organizational performance toward the goal of sustainable development” (GRI, 2011, S. 
3). Die Leitlinien umfassen nachhaltigkeitsbezogene Prinzipien, Prozesse sowie Perfor-
mancekennzahlen und berücksichtigen ausserdem branchenspezifische Besonderheiten in der 
Relevanz verschiedener Indikatoren (GRI, 2013a, 2013b). Daneben existieren unternehmens-
interne Richtlinien sowie weitere Empfehlungen von Branchenverbänden (Verband der Che-
mischen Industrie et al., 2013; International Council on Mining and Metals, 2014). In Europa 
ist die gesetzliche Regelungsdichte zur Nachhaltigkeitsberichterstattung verglichen mit der 
klassischen finanziellen Berichterstattung gering, nimmt jedoch tendenziell zu.6 Parallel zur 
umfangreicher und detaillierter werdenden Berichterstattung in der Praxis kommen in For-
schungsarbeiten zunehmend komplexere Benchmarks zur Beurteilung der Nachhaltigkeitsbe-
richterstattung zum Einsatz, so zum Beispiel Ansätze in Anlehnung an die GRI-Leitlinien 
(Cho et al., 2012; Clarkson et al., 2008; Clarkson et al., 2011). Sie ersetzen einfachere Metho-
den der Inhaltsanalyse, die auf eine geringere Anzahl von teilweise nach Informationstyp ge-
wichteten Berichtselementen zurückgreifen (de Villiers & van Staden, 2011; Aerts & Cor-
mier, 2009; Patten, 2002; Cho & Patten, 2007; Cho et al., 2006; de Villiers & van Staden, 
2006; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Hughes et al., 2001). Daneben kommen auch indirekte Mess-
konzepte zum Einsatz, die zum Beispiel auf der Reaktion von Unternehmen auf Umfragen 
oder der Wahrnehmung der Berichterstattung durch die Teilnehmer von Experimenten beru-
hen (Dawkins & Fraas, 2011; Rockness, 1985). 
                                                 
6 Vgl. zum Beispiel die verpflichtenden Angaben zu Kohlendioxidemissionen in Grossbritannien ab 2013 
(Companies Act 2006 Regulations 2013). Ausserdem müssen Schwedische Unternehmen im Staatsbesitz ge-
mäss den GRI-Leitlinien berichten (Richtlinien zur externen Berichterstattung für staatliche Unternehmen, 
2007). In Frankreich sind seit 2012 zusätzliche Berichtspflichten wirksam (Grenelle II, 2010). Der Europäi-
schen Kommission wurde am 16. April 2013 die Gesetzgebungsvorlage C7-0103/13 zur Offenlegung nichtfi-
nanzieller Informationen vorgelegt, die nach der Umsetzung in nationales Recht zu zusätzlichen Berichts-
pflichten führen kann. 
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Im Forschungsgebiet II wird Fragen nach dem Nutzen und den Determinanten unternehmeri-
scher Nachhaltigkeit aus der Perspektive der Unternehmen nachgegangen. Von besonderem 
Forschungsinteresse ist die Beziehung zwischen der ökonomischen Dimension der Nachhal-
tigkeit und ihren beiden anderen Dimensionen, wobei “attempts to relate social [and environ-
mental] performance to economic performance were undertaken largely in the hopes of estab-
lishing a positive relationship that might be persuasive to business leaders who were skeptical 
about the value” (Wood, 2010, S. 60). Aus theoretischer Sicht konkurrieren hier verschiedene 
Ansätze zum Umgang mit umfassender unternehmerischer Nachhaltigkeit. Nach dem traditi-
onellen Ansatz optimiert allein das eher kurzfristige Streben der Unternehmen nach Gewinn-
maximierung die Gesamtwohlfahrt, während der aufgeklärte Ansatz langfristige unternehme-
rische Eigeninteressen berücksichtigt und zusätzlichen Zielgrössen eine Bedeutung zuspricht. 
Hinzu kommt der verantwortungsbewusste Ansatz, nach dem sich umfassende Nachhaltigkeit 
für das einzelne Unternehmen möglicherweise nicht auszahlt, sie aber dennoch der gesamtge-
sellschaftlich wünschenswerte Weg ist. Ausserdem könnten Unternehmen nach dem konfusen 
Ansatz ihre Nachhaltigkeitsbestrebungen mit ethischen Argumenten rechtfertigen, aber trotz-
dem einen finanziellen Nutzen erwarten (McGuire, 1969). Die empirischen Ergebnisse zum 
Zusammenhang zwischen finanzieller Unternehmensperformance und den beiden verbleiben-
den Dimensionen der Nachhaltigkeit deuten in Meta-Analysen trotz aller methodischen 
Schwierigkeiten insgesamt und über verschiedene Industriegruppen hinweg auf einen positi-
ven Zusammenhang hin (Orlitzky et al., 2003). “After 35 years of research and over 200 stud-
ies, there is a conclusive […] answer to the question of whether companies benefit financially 
from social performance. The effect of CSP [corporate social performance] on CFP [corporate 
financial performance] is small, positive, and significant” (Margolis et al., 2009, S. 28).7 
In der Frage nach den Determinanten der Nachhaltigkeitsberichterstattung besteht bislang 
weder hinsichtlich des theoretischen Hintergrunds noch der empirischen Forschungsergebnis-
se ein einheitliches Bild. Einigkeit besteht jedoch weitgehend darin, dass aus Sicht der Unter-
nehmen bei der Auswahl und Darstellungsweise konkreter Berichtsinhalte nicht nur die In-
formationsbedürfnisse der Stakeholder, sondern besonders unternehmenseigene strategische 
Interessen von Bedeutung sind (Cho et al., 2012; Clarkson et al., 2011; Clarkson et al., 2008; 
Cho & Patten, 2007; de Villiers & van Staden, 2006; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Patten, 2002). 
Die Vertreter der Theorie der freiwilligen Offenlegung gehen davon aus, dass ein Unterneh-
men private Informationen solange zurückhält, bis die erwarteten positiven Effekte auf den 
Marktwert des Unternehmens die erwarteten negativen Effekte auf ebendiesen übersteigen 
(Verrecchia, 1983). Übertragen auf die Nachhaltigkeitsperformance eines Unternehmens folgt 
daraus, dass umso mehr Nachhaltigkeitsinformationen veröffentlicht werden, je besser die 
Performance ist – es besteht demnach ein positiver Zusammenhang zwischen beiden Grössen 
(Clarkson et al., 2008). Im Gegensatz dazu gehen Vertreter der Legitimitätstheorie von einem 
negativen Zusammenhang aus. Als die Legitimität eines Unternehmens wird “a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 
1995, S. 574) verstanden. Sollte die Nachhaltigkeitsperformance eines Unternehmens den 
                                                 
7 CSP umfasst die ökologische und die soziale Dimension der Nachhaltigkeit. 
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gesellschaftlichen Normen widersprechen, so kann ein Unternehmen seine Legitimität verlie-
ren (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975) und zentrale Stakeholder können ihre für den Unternehmenser-
folg wesentliche Unterstützung verweigern (Davis, 1973; Wood, 1991). Ein Beispiel dafür ist 
ein unvorteilhaftes Unternehmensimage, welches zu unzufriedenen Kunden, Umsatzrück-
gang, Schwierigkeiten bei der Mitarbeitergewinnung und -bindung sowie einem höheren Ri-
siko von Rechtsstreitigkeiten und regulatorischen Auflagen führen kann (Ameer & Othman, 
2012; Ihlen & Roper, 2014; Kollman & Prakash, 2001; Wood, 1991). “Legitimacy is mainly 
about perception” (Aerts & Cormier, 2009, S. 1), das heisst, eine Entkopplung der Wahrneh-
mung eines Unternehmens durch seine Stakeholder von seinem tatsächlichen Zustand der 
Nachhaltigkeitsperformance ist möglich. Daraus lassen sich verschiedene Strategien zur Be-
wahrung der Legitimität ableiten. Es wird empfohlen, zuerst die öffentliche Wahrnehmung 
durch die Offenlegung von Informationen zur Nachhaltigkeit zu beeinflussen, danach Hand-
lungen mit Symbolcharakter durchzuführen und nur in letzter Instanz die Nachhaltigkeitsper-
formance selbst zu ändern (Sethi, 1978). Neuere Ansätze unterscheiden zwischen Strategien 
zur Vermeidung von Legitimitätsrisiken, zur Änderung gesellschaftlicher Normen, zur Beein-
flussung öffentlicher Wahrnehmungen und zur Erreichung einer Übereinstimmung mit gesell-
schaftlichen Erwartungen (O’Donovan, 2002). In diesem Rahmen ist auch eine gezielte Be-
einflussung der Stakeholder durch die Unternehmensberichterstattung möglich, wodurch die 
Nachhaltigkeitsberichterstattung zu einem Werkzeug zur Sicherstellung der Legitimität eines 
Unternehmens wird (Deegan, 2002). So können Unternehmen beispielsweise Greenwashing 
betreiben, indem sie von kritischen Themen durch eine selektive und besonders umfangreiche 
Veröffentlichung positiver Informationen ablenken (Lyon & Maxwell, 2011). In diesem Fall 
besteht zwischen der tatsächlichen Nachhaltigkeitsperformance und der Quantität der Nach-
haltigkeitsberichterstattung ein negativer Zusammenhang. 
Vor dem Hintergrund der gegensätzlich interpretierten Implikationen von freiwilliger Offen-
legungstheorie und Legitimitätstheorie kommen empirische Studien beim Einfluss der Nach-
haltigkeitsperformance auf die Quantität der Berichterstattung zu positiven Ergebnissen (Al-
Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Bewley & Li, 2000; Clarkson et al., 2008), negativen Ergebnissen (Cho 
et al., 2012; Clarkson et al., 2011; Dawkins & Fraas, 2011; Cho & Patten, 2007; Cho et al., 
2006; de Villiers & van Staden, 2006; Patten, 2002; Hughes et al., 2001) oder können keinen 
Zusammenhang nachweisen (Fekrat et al., 1996; Ingram & Frazier, 1980; Rockness, 1985; 
Wiseman, 1982). Neben der Nachhaltigkeitsperformance selbst und der Nachhaltigkeitsstra-
tegie eines Unternehmens wird auch von einem Einfluss der Unternehmensgrösse (Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2008; Clarkson et al., 2008; Clarkson et al., 2011; Cormier et al., 2005; Dawkins 
& Fraas, 2011; Kolk, 2003; Patten, 2002), der finanziellen Performance (Cormier & Magnan, 
2003; Cormier et al., 2005; Neu et al., 1998; Ullmann, 1985) sowie des Verschuldungsgrads 
(Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Clarkson et al., 2008; Cormier & Magnan, 2003) ausgegangen. 
Es konnten weiterhin länderspezifische Unterschiede vor dem Hintergrund abweichender re-
gulatorischer Rahmenbedingungen und kultureller Varianzen (Fekrat et al., 1996; Kolk, 2003; 
Kolk et al., 2001; Orij, 2010; van der Laan Smith et al., 2005) sowie industriespezifische Un-
terschiede (Cho & Patten, 2007; Dawkins & Fraas, 2011; Patten, 2002; Roberts, 1992) gezeigt 
werden. 
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Das Forschungsgebiet III beschäftigt sich mit der Prüfung von Nachhaltigkeitsberichten. Hier 
werden die Determinanten der Wahlentscheidung zur externen Prüfung von Nachhaltigkeits-
berichten untersucht sowie die Aussagekraft der veröffentlichten Prüfberichte und Aspekte 
der Prüfungsdurchführung. Die Entscheidung zur Prüfung des Nachhaltigkeitsberichts erfolgt 
in Europa weitgehend freiwillig, jedoch ist auch hier eine zunehmende Regelungsdichte zu 
beobachten.8 Empirische Studien kommen zum Ergebnis, dass Prüfungen häufiger in Ländern 
mit breiter Stakeholder-Orientierung und somit einer relativ geringeren Bedeutung der Share-
holder durchgeführt werden und ausserdem institutionelle Faktoren von Bedeutung sind (Kolk 
& Perego, 2010; Simnett et al., 2009). Weiterhin beeinflusst die Industriezugehörigkeit sowie 
die Unternehmensgrösse die Entscheidung zur Prüfung (Cho et al., 2014; Simnett et al., 
2009). Die Aussagekraft der veröffentlichten Prüfberichte steht in der Kritik, was auf die feh-
lende Einbindung externer Stakeholder in den Prüfprozess und damit den massgeblichen Ein-
fluss von Eigeninteressen der Unternehmen zurückgeführt wird (Ball et al., 2000; Cooper & 
Owen, 2007; Deegan et al., 2006; O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005). Der zugehörige Begriff des 
Managerial Capture “sees management take control of the whole process […] by strategically 
collecting and disseminating only the information it deems appropriate to advance the corpo-
rate image, rather than being truly transparent and accountable to the society it serves” (Owen 
et al., 2000, S. 85). Auf der Ebene der Prüfungsdurchführung wird deutlich, dass zwischen 
Prüfer und geprüftem Unternehmen ein dichtes und iteratives Beziehungsgeflecht besteht 
(O’Dwyer, 2011; O’Dwyer et al., 2011; Park & Brorson, 2005). Neben der negativen Inter-
pretation dieses Geflechts vor dem Hintergrund von Managerial Capture liegen auch Ergeb-
nisse vor, welche die Unabhängigkeit des Prüfers hervorheben und nach denen sich Prüfungs-
gesellschaften zu ihrer Verantwortung gegenüber externen Stakeholdern bekennen (O’Dwyer, 
2011; O’Dwyer et al., 2011). Hinzu kommen Erkenntnisse zu den Motiven der Nachhaltig-
keitsprüfung aus Sicht der Unternehmen. Sie deuten auf die Erhöhung der Glaubwürdigkeit 
und performance- sowie prozessbezogene Verbesserungen als Leitmotive hin (Edgley et al., 
2010; Park & Brorson, 2005; Simnett et al., 2009), was eine positive Auslegung von Manage-
rial Capture zumindest nicht ausschliesst. 
Wird die externe Prüfung des Nachhaltigkeitsberichts als Teil der übergeordneten Nachhal-
tigkeitsstrategie eines Unternehmens betrachtet, so lässt sich annehmen, dass auch die Prü-
fung zur Sicherstellung der Legitimität der Unternehmensaktivitäten beitragen soll (Darnall et 
al., 2009; O’Dwyer et al., 2011). Damit kann die Prüfung letztlich neben der Nachhaltigkeits-
berichterstattung selbst als weiteres strategisches Werkzeug zur Legitimitätssicherung gegen-
über den Stakeholdern eines Unternehmens angesehen werden. Je nach Zielsetzung des Un-
ternehmens, welches die Prüfung in Auftrag gibt und bezahlt, können sich daraus sowohl ne-
gative Effekte im Sinne des bisherigen Verständnisses von Managerial Capture als auch posi-
tive Effekte im Sinne einer ernsthaften Verbesserung interner Prozesse, der Nachhaltigkeits-
performance und der Transparenz gegenüber externen Stakeholdern ergeben. 
                                                 
8 Vgl. zum Beispiel die verpflichtende externe Prüfung in Frankreich seit 2012 (Grenelle II, 2010). Ebenso ist 
eine externe Prüfung in Schweden für Unternehmen im Staatsbesitz vorgeschrieben (Richtlinien zur externen 
Berichterstattung für staatliche Unternehmen, 2007). Werden einzelne Informationen mit Bezug zu Nachhal-
tigkeitsindikatoren im Geschäftsbericht veröffentlicht, so kann für diese ebenfalls eine Prüfungspflicht im 
Rahmen der Abschlussprüfung bestehen. 
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1.3 Beitrag und Zusammenfassung der eingebrachten Papers 
Die drei in die kumulative Dissertation eingehenden Papers adressieren mehrere offene Fra-
gen innerhalb der Forschungsgebiete I, II und III. Das erste Paper “Zusammenhang zwischen 
Nachhaltigkeitsperformance und Nachhaltigkeitsberichterstattung – Legitimität oder finanzi-
elle Überlegungen?” kann dabei den Gebieten I und II zugeordnet werden. Diesem Paper liegt 
die Idee zu Grunde, dass die Nachhaltigkeitsberichterstattung von Unternehmen als strategi-
sches Werkzeug eingesetzt wird, um ihren Marktwert zu Gunsten ihrer Shareholder zu stei-
gern und gleichzeitig die Legitimität gegenüber anderen wesentlichen Stakeholdern sicherzu-
stellen. Hinter beiden Zielen stehen mit der freiwilligen Offenlegungstheorie und der Legiti-
mitätstheorie unterschiedliche theoretische Erklärungsansätze, die gemäss der bisherigen Lite-
ratur in Konkurrenz zueinander stehen und jeweils einen entgegengesetzten Zusammenhang 
zwischen Nachhaltigkeitsperformance und -berichterstattung implizieren. Nach der freiwilli-
gen Offenlegungstheorie werden nur ausreichend positive Informationen berichtet, während 
nach der Legitimitätstheorie schlechte Informationen verschleiert und zur Ablenkung mit um-
fangreichen anderen Informationen ergänzt werden. Der erste Beitrag dieses Papers liegt in 
der neuen Sichtweise, dass beide Theorien gemeinsam und gleichzeitig Bestand haben kön-
nen, da Unternehmen sowohl im Interesse ihrer Shareholder als auch zur Wahrung ihrer Legi-
timität im Interesse zentraler weiterer Stakeholder agieren können (Forschungsgebiet II). Eine 
Schlüsselrolle bei der Beseitigung des bisherigen Widerspruchs beider Theorien liegt in der 
Messung der Nachhaltigkeitsberichterstattung. Im Paper wird die Herangehensweise früherer 
Messkonzepte verfeinert, indem durchgängig zwischen einer quantitativen und somit ver-
gleichbaren Form der Informationsbereitstellung und einer verbalen und somit schwer ver-
gleichbaren Form unterschieden wird. So kann gezeigt werden, dass die marktorientierte frei-
willige Offenlegungstheorie einen positiven Zusammenhang zwischen Nachhaltigkeitsper-
formance und quantitativer Berichterstattung erklären kann, während gleichzeitig die Legiti-
mitätstheorie einen negativen Zusammenhang zwischen Performance und verbaler Berichter-
stattung erklärt. Bei der Messung der Berichterstattung und Performance kommen verbesserte 
Proxies zum Einsatz, die neben der ökologischen Dimension zusätzlich die soziale Dimension 
der Nachhaltigkeit berücksichtigen. Darin liegt der zweite Forschungsbeitrag dieses Papers 
(Forschungsgebiet I). Die empirischen Ergebnisse einer bivariaten Analyse für 50 Deutsche 
und Schweizer Grossunternehmen liefern erste Belege für die theoretisch vermuteten Zusam-
menhänge und zeigen dabei methodisch tiefer gehenden Forschungsbedarf an. 
Das zweite Paper “The Relationship between Sustainability Performance and Sustainability 
Disclosure Quality – Hard Numbers Beat Smooth Talk” knüpft direkt am vom vorangegange-
nen Paper aufgezeigten Forschungsbedarf an. Damit die Vereinbarkeit von freiwilliger Offen-
legungstheorie und Legitimitätstheorie noch klarer herausgearbeitet werden kann, blendet das 
Paper die Quantität der Nachhaltigkeitsberichterstattung aus und fokussiert speziell auf Unter-
schiede in der Qualität der berichteten Informationen. Die Stichprobe von 195 Unternehmen 
aus sieben voneinander abgegrenzten Europäischen Ländern und 19 individuell berücksichtig-
ten Industriegruppen erlaubt belastbarere Aussagen zum Einfluss der Nachhaltigkeitsperfor-
mance auf die Nachhaltigkeitsberichterstattung. Dazu trägt auch der multivariate Analysean-
satz mit weiteren unternehmensspezifischen Kontrollvariablen bei (Forschungsgebiet II). Das 
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Messkonzept zur Berichterstattung wird direkt auf deren Qualität zugeschnitten und berück-
sichtigt auch die industriespezifisch variierende Bedeutung einzelner Informationen. Ausser-
dem wird die Messung der Nachhaltigkeitsperformance im sozialen Bereich angepasst, um 
besser die tatsächliche Leistung der bewerteten Unternehmen abzubilden (Forschungsgebiet 
I). Die Ergebnisse stützen die Implikationen des ersten Forschungsbeitrags und zeigen, dass 
Unternehmen mit schlechter Nachhaltigkeitsperformance über die betroffenen Elemente aus 
Legitimitätsüberlegungen heraus in niedrigerer Qualität berichten, während vorwiegend gute 
Performer freiwillig Informationen von höherer Qualität offenlegen. Weiterhin lässt sich aus 
den Kontrollvariablen ablesen, dass eine in Fragen der unternehmerischen Nachhaltigkeit ak-
tive strategische Orientierung, angezeigt durch die freiwillige externe Prüfung des Nachhal-
tigkeitsberichts, mit einer höheren Informationsqualität einhergeht. Bei gemeinsamer Betrach-
tung weisen das erste und das zweite Paper auf zentrale Probleme der Nachhaltigkeitsbericht-
erstattung der letzten Jahre hin. Es wird deutlich, dass in mehreren Europäischen Ländern 
nicht nur eine Greenwashing-Problematik in Bezug auf schlechte Performer besteht, sondern 
dass auch hinsichtlich der Qualität der berichteten Informationen wesentliche Spielräume be-
stehen, innerhalb derer Unternehmensinteressen eine vergleichbare Nachhaltigkeitsberichter-
stattung verhindern können. Ohne mögliche unerwünschte Nebenwirkungen einer strengeren 
Regulierung der Nachhaltigkeitsberichterstattung zu betrachten, liefen die Papers zumindest 
theoretische Argumente zu Gunsten der aktuellen Entwicklung hin zu einheitlicheren und 
bindenden Vorschriften für Europäische Unternehmen. 
Nachdem die beiden ersten Papers die Zusammenhänge zwischen Nachhaltigkeitsperfor-
mance und Berichterstattung sowie zwischen externer Prüfung und Berichterstattung aufge-
zeigt haben, beleuchtet das dritte Paper “The Nature of Managerial Capture in Sustainability 
Assurance Engagements” den noch fehlenden dritten Zusammenhang zwischen Nachhaltig-
keitsperformance und der Prüfung von Nachhaltigkeitsberichten. Es geht um die Frage, wie 
das strategische Eigeninteresse der Unternehmen deren freiwillige und kostenpflichtige Aus-
wahl externer Prüfungsleistungen beeinflusst. In der bisherigen Literatur wird davon ausge-
gangen, dass Managerial Capture zu einer beschönigenden und gegenüber externen Stakehol-
dern nicht ausreichend Transparenz schaffenden Prüfung führt. Das Paper stellt die Bedeu-
tung der Prüfung als weiteres Werkzeug zur Legitimitätssicherung der Unternehmen heraus 
und leitet daraus ab, dass Managerial Capture nicht in jedem Fall zu einer eingeschränkten 
Prüfungsintensität führen muss. Die Ergebnisse der empirischen Untersuchung für 122 Euro-
päische Unternehmen zeigen einen im Durchschnitt negativen Zusammenhang zwischen 
Nachhaltigkeitsperformance und Prüfungsintensität. Gerade die schlechten Performer profitie-
ren am meisten von der zusätzlichen Glaubwürdigkeit ihrer Nachhaltigkeitsaktivitäten durch 
eine intensive externe Prüfung. Gleichzeitig kann die Prüfung zur Verbesserung interner Sys-
teme und letztlich der Nachhaltigkeitsperformance beitragen. Somit kann Managerial Capture 
in einer regulierungsarmen Umgebung auch zu positiven Effekten führen, die nicht nur das 
geprüfte Unternehmen selbst betreffen, sondern durch den Zugewinn an Transparenz auch 
seine Stakeholder. Das Paper trägt neben seiner empirischen Perspektive und dem entwickel-
ten Messkonzept der Prüfungsintensität mit einem breiteren und neutraleren Verständnis von 
Managerial Capture zum bisherigen Forschungsstand bei. Ausserdem werden mit der finanzi-
ellen Unternehmensperformance und den Gesamtaufwendungen für Leistungen von Prü-
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fungsgesellschaften weitere Determinanten der Prüfungsintensität offengelegt, die auch im 
Verdrängungswettbewerb im Markt für die Prüfung von Nachhaltigkeitsberichten von Bedeu-
tung sind. Mit dem positiven Einfluss sowohl der Unabhängigkeit als auch der Kompetenz 
des Prüfers wird zusätzlich die Anbieterseite in die Betrachtung einbezogen (Forschungsge-
biet III). 
Die übergreifende Betrachtung der Ergebnisse aller drei Papers macht deutlich, dass hinsicht-
lich der Nachhaltigkeitsberichterstattung und deren Prüfung bei Europäischen Unternehmen 
noch Entwicklungspotenzial besteht. Das heterogene Gesamtbild spiegelt nicht nur das theo-
retisch uneinheitliche Verständnis von Nachhaltigkeit im Unternehmenskontext wider, son-
dern zeigt auch die Vielfalt an Ausgestaltungsmöglichkeiten in einem vergleichsweise 
schwach regulierten Umfeld. Dem Thema umfassender Nachhaltigkeit wird von den Unter-
nehmen weiterhin eine unterschiedliche strategische Bedeutung beigemessen, die von Mini-
malstandards bis hin zu einer Einstufung als zentralen langfristigen Erfolgsfaktor reicht. Es 
bleibt abzuwarten, ob sich in Zukunft mehr Unternehmen von den zumindest theoretisch im-
plizierten Vorteilen eines umfassenden Nachhaltigkeitsverständnisses für die Unternehmen 
selbst und für ihre Stakeholder überzeugen lassen. 
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The Relationship between Sustainability Performance and Sustainability Disclosure 
Quality – Hard Numbers Beat Smooth Talk1 
ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the relationship between corporate sustainability performance (CSP) 
and the quality of corporate sustainability disclosure (CSD). We respond to the call in recent 
research to change the research setting to investigate the overlap between voluntary disclosure 
theory (VDT) and legitimacy theory (LT) more rigorously. By concentrating exclusively on 
the quality – and not the quantity – of CSD, we are able to show the simultaneous applicabil-
ity of predictions derived from both VDT and LT. With respect to CSD, we derive and assess 
information items by distinguishing between higher and lower quality disclosures. Our ap-
proach to CSP measurement is based on multi-dimensional proxies for a firm’s environmental 
and social performance. The results from a sample of 195 European companies illuminate 
how VDT and LT overlap. We find evidence that poor sustainability performers use lower 
quality CSD to protect their sustainability image and that higher quality CSD is associated 
with superior CSP. 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, the concept of corporate sustainability has received growing attention from 
many segments of society. The sizable numbers of ethically managed mutual funds and ethi-
cally screened portfolios illustrate that it may not suffice for companies to be merely finan-
cially successful; instead, firms may also be expected to act responsibly with respect to their 
environment. This development has been accompanied by various sustainability initiatives, 
such as the Carbon Disclosure Project, the Principles for Responsible Investment and the 
Equator Principles. Investors increasingly demand information about companies’ sustainabil-
ity performances. The recent action of 24 institutional investors that complained about the 
“lack of information as a result of limited or non-disclosure of ESG [i.e., environmental, so-
cial and corporate governance] data” (Abberley, quoted in Reuters, 2011) emphasizes the im-
portance of high quality sustainability disclosures in the capital markets. In an open letter, 
these same institutional investors asked the world’s 30 largest stock exchanges to overhaul 
current listing rules to “force companies to improve their sustainability reporting” (Reuters, 
2011). The information provided by a company must enable investors and other stakeholders 
to assess the company’s true sustainability performance. 
However, the relationship between corporate sustainability performance (CSP) and corporate 
sustainability disclosure (CSD) remains ambiguous both theoretically and empirically. In es-
sence, there are two theoretical concepts involved. According to legitimacy theory (LT), on 
the one hand, companies use CSD to improve the public perception of their CSP (Deegan, 
2002). Researchers therefore interpret a negative relationship between CSP and the level of 
                                                 
1 This paper is co-authored by Dr. Katrin Hummel, University of Zurich. 
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CSD as an indication of the applicability of LT (Dawkins & Fraas, 2011; Patten, 2002). On 
the other hand, based on voluntary disclosure theory (VDT) it is argued that a company with 
good CSP is incentivized to disclose information regarding its performance to increase its 
market value. Following this stream of research, a positive relationship between CSP and the 
level of CSD is posited. Thus, opposing predictions regarding the relationship between CSP 
and CSD are typically derived from these two theories and the mixed empirical results from 
prior studies cannot clarify this relationship. Recent research has therefore asked whether 
these two theories are partially overlapping rather than mutually exclusive and has found 
some preliminary evidence to justify this reasoning (Clarkson, Li, Richardson, & Vasvari, 
2008). Building on this research, our study provides a more rigorous examination of this rela-
tionship by concentrating on the quality dimension of CSD. 
With respect to the measurement of both CSD and CSP, prior research has not yet established 
a consistent approach. For instance, some studies concentrate on the reporting of a few disclo-
sure items (Patten, 2002), whereas others attempt to comprehensively capture CSD (Clarkson 
et al., 2008). With respect to scoring systems, most studies employ a binary scoring (disclo-
sure vs. non-disclosure), whereas some utilize ordinal ratings (Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen, & 
Hughes, 2004). This heterogeneity is even more remarkable with respect to the measurement 
and operationalization of CSP. Some studies rely exclusively on a single indicator of envi-
ronmental performance, such as emissions or waste (Clarkson, Overell, & Chapple, 2011), 
whereas other studies’ approaches are based on rating metrics provided by specialized rating 
agencies, such as Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD, today MSCI) (Cho & Patten, 2007; Cho, 
Patten, & Roberts, 2006; Dawkins & Fraas, 2011). Because the validity and/or reliability of 
these measurement approaches are questionable, several researchers have called for the de-
velopment of more refined measures of CSP (Hong & Andersen, 2011). 
Against this background, the aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between CSP 
and the quality of CSD in a refined setting and thereby to further illuminate how VDT and LT 
overlap. In so doing, our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, we respond 
to the call by Clarkson et al. (2008) for future research and switch the focus of enquiry from 
CSD quantity to CSD quality. Second, we present improved and transparent measurement ap-
proaches for CSP and CSD quality that include the social dimension of corporate sustainabil-
ity. Third, we apply these measurement schemes to a sample of 195 publicly traded European 
companies. Empirical findings from our study support the preliminary evidence of previous 
research on the overlap between VDT and LT. In addition, the results from our study enhance 
the knowledge about other determinants of CSD quality, which is not sufficiently understood 
in Western Europe (Fifka, 2013). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the related lit-
erature and develops the hypotheses. The section following that explains our research design 
and focuses, in particular, on the measurement schemes for CSD quality and CSP that are ap-
plied in this study. In addition, this section describes the data sample and the empirical model. 
Next, we provide descriptive results and our findings from regression analyses and robustness 
checks. The final section concludes the paper. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
From a theoretical perspective, nearly all previous empirical studies in this field are based on 
VDT or LT (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Cho, Guidry, Hageman, & Patten, 2012; Cho & Patten, 
2007; Clarkson et al., 2008; Clarkson et al., 2011; de Villiers & van Staden, 2006; Patten, 
2002). These studies focus primarily on the level of CSD (i.e., CSD quantity) by classifying 
each disclosure item as either disclosed (equal to 1) or non-disclosed (equal to 0). A positive 
relationship between CSP and the level of CSD is then interpreted as support for the applica-
bility of VDT, and a negative relationship is attributed to LT. Such a research design neglects 
the potential overlap between these two theories because the theories are treated as incompat-
ible with one another. The mixed results of previous empirical studies (for a positive relation-
ship between CSP and CSD see Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008; for a negative 
relationship see Cho and Patten, 2007; de Villiers and van Staden, 2006) are characteristic of 
this research setting. Moreover, these empirical findings are seldom unambiguous. For in-
stance, Clarkson et al. (2008) interpret a positive relationship between environmental perfor-
mance and the level of environmental disclosure as evidence for the application of VDT but 
refer to LT to explain “interesting patterns in the data” (Clarkson et al., 2008, p. 323). At-
tempting to investigate the overlap between the two theories (see also Deegan, 2002; Clarkson 
et al., 2011) more rigorously, researchers have developed measurement schemes for CSD that 
distinguish between “monetary” and “non-monetary” (Patten, 2002) or “hard” and “soft” dis-
closure items (Clarkson et al., 2008). These researchers argue that VDT predicts a positive 
relationship between CSP and the use of “hard” disclosures, whereas LT predicts a negative 
relationship between CSP and the use of “soft” disclosures. However, because firms can score 
high on the disclosure of both “hard” and “soft” items, the results do not permit a clear dis-
tinction between the applicability of the two theories. For instance, a positive relationship be-
tween environmental performance and the level of hard disclosure can be attributed to either 
VDT (i.e., better environmental performance is related to more hard disclosure) or LT (i.e., 
worse environmental performance is related to less hard disclosure). Similarly, a negative re-
lationship between environmental performance and soft disclosure can support both VDT 
(better environmental performance is related to less soft disclosure) and LT (worse environ-
mental performance is related to more soft disclosure). Accordingly, Clarkson et al. (2008, p. 
325) call for a switch in the “focus of enquiry”. To be able to clearly distinguish between the 
applicability of VDT and the applicability of LT, we must examine the quality of CSD in lieu 
of the quantity of CSD. Thus, we develop a research design in which both theories can be 
tested simultaneously and not exclusive of one another, which may thereby provide theoreti-
cal and empirical insights into how these theories may overlap. 
VDT explains why managers of a risky asset voluntarily disclose information about this asset 
by formulating an equilibrium threshold level of disclosure in which the cost associated with 
the disclosure is precisely equal to the information’s effect on the price of the risky asset 
(Verrecchia, 1983). The model offers an explanation for why rational managers withhold un-
favorable information below a critical threshold level of disclosure. Although this theory orig-
inally referred to the voluntary disclosure of financial information, researchers have also ap-
plied it to explain the voluntary disclosure of non-financial information (Bewley & Li, 2000; 
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Clarkson et al., 2008; Li, Richardson, & Thornton, 1997). They argue that a company with 
superior CSP voluntarily discloses non-financial information to reveal its true performance 
type and potentially increase its market value (Clarkson et al., 2008). VDT’s reasoning builds 
on decision-useful information, i.e., information that is objective, reliable, comparable and 
relevant to investors. Following previous research (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Bewley & Li, 
2000; Cho & Patten, 2007; Clarkson et al., 2008), we distinguish between quantitative (higher 
quality) and qualitative (lower quality) information. We define quantitative disclosure as the 
disclosure of relevant and comparable numerical data that fulfills or exceeds precisely defined 
quality requirements. Qualitative disclosure refers to any lower quality disclosures that can be 
either numeric or non-numeric but that do not fulfill these criteria. We argue that the reason-
ing of VDT applies primarily to quantitative disclosure because quantitative disclosure is 
more reliable and comparable than qualitative disclosure (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson 
et al., 2008; Clarkson et al., 2011). Companies with superior CSP disclose higher quality 
quantitative information to signal their true (unobservable) performance type. Moreover, the 
disclosure of quantitative information cannot easily be mimicked by companies with poor 
CSP (Clarkson et al., 2008), which enables superior performers to distinguish themselves 
from poorly performing companies. Following this reasoning, we expect to find that compa-
nies with superior CSP primarily disclose quantitative (higher quality) information. We for-
mally state our hypothesis as follows: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between CSP and the level of quantitative (higher quality) 
 CSD. 
Legitimacy theory (LT) offers another theoretical explanation for the voluntary disclosure of 
non-financial information. Suchman (1995, p. 574) defines legitimacy as “a generalized per-
ception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. This abstract 
concept of society is more precisely delineated by Freeman’s (1984, p. 25) definition of 
stakeholders as “groups […] that can affect, or are affected by, the accomplishment of organi-
zational purpose” (Wood, 1991). According to Dowling and Pfeffer (1975, p. 122), any dis-
parity between the actions of an organization and the socially constructed system of norms is 
a “threat to organizational legitimacy” and therefore to the organization’s long-term survival 
(Davis, 1973). Sethi (1978) offers three legitimation tactics to close such legitimacy gaps be-
tween business performance and societal expectations. He recommends changing public per-
ceptions first through information and second through symbolic actions; if these actions prove 
ineffective, he recommends altering the business performance itself. Similarly, O’Donovan 
(2002) describes four possible response tactics to legitimacy threats: avoidance, altering social 
values, shaping societal perceptions of the organization and compliance with societal expecta-
tions. 
A wide-ranging lack of sustainability can threat the legitimacy of a company. LT suggests that 
particularly poor performing companies use CSD as a legitimation tactic to influence public 
perceptions of their CSP (Deegan, 2002). In this case, CSD serves as a tool to build or main-
tain a company’s sustainability image. Thus, poor performing companies prefer qualitative 
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(lower quality) information (e.g., information that is superficial, unnecessary, incomplete, in-
comparable, ambiguous or non-numeric) because stakeholders can easily identify quantitative 
(higher quality) information as poor performance values that could be interpreted as a lack of 
sustainability. Although there are professional stakeholders that cannot be easily misled by 
such lower quality information, the general public’s perception of a firm’s sustainability is 
also influenced by non-professional stakeholders that may not notice such disclosure tactics. 
Consequently, we expect that companies with poor CSP prefer qualitative (lower quality) to 
quantitative (higher quality) reporting on critical issues to close an existing or impending le-
gitimacy gap. We posit the following relationship: 
H2: There is a negative relationship between CSP and the level of qualitative (lower quality) 
 CSD. 
The two hypotheses delineated above are intended to clearly distinguish between quantitative 
(higher quality) and qualitative (lower quality) CSD. Consistent with both VDT and LT, 
companies may also opt for non-disclosure on a specific issue. Thus, evidence falsifying one 
of the hypotheses does not necessarily allow inferences for the other hypothesis. Additionally, 
our arguments are based on the assumption that firms’ reporting behavior is driven by incen-
tives to increase market value (VDT) and at the same time by attempts to avoid the negative 
consequences of threatened legitimacy (LT). These combined forces result in varying CSD 
quality that depends on actual CSP. Thus, the two stated hypotheses are tested simultaneously 
and not against one another. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Methodological requirements 
To ensure the rigor of our research design, CSD and CSP must be reliably and validly meas-
ured (Krippendorff, 2013). In addition to these traditional measurement criteria, further re-
quirements must be fulfilled to account for our specific research design. These criteria consist 
of congruence in the content of the CSD and CSP measurement schemes, the multi-
dimensionality of the measurement schemes and informational relevance. Content-based con-
gruence refers to the direct linkage between CSP and CSD quality measurements. To precise-
ly assess the theoretical implications derived from VDT and LT, proxies for both CSD and 
CSP must capture similar content, for instance, reporting elements on emissions and corre-
sponding emissions performance data. Otherwise changes in CSP are not reflected in the ob-
served CSD quality. The multi-dimensionality criterion stems from the understanding of sus-
tainability developed by Elkington (1997), as described by the triple-bottom-line approach. 
Both measurement schemes should cover the environmental and social dimensions of sustain-
ability and account for different aspects within each dimension. The criterion of relevance de-
rives from VDT and refers to the decision usefulness of information. It is also required by the 
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Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) G3.1 reporting guidelines (“materiality”, GRI, 2011a) and 
financial reporting standards (FASB, 2010).2 
CSD quality measurement scheme 
The GRI guidelines define sustainability reporting as “the practice of measuring, disclosing, 
and being accountable to internal and external stakeholders for organizational performance 
toward the goal of sustainable development” (GRI, 2011a, p. 3). In our study, we concentrate 
on a company’s voluntary disclosure of environmental and social, in particular employee-
related information.3 In the field of voluntary, non-financial disclosure, content analysis has 
become the primary research methodology. Researchers first identify relevant information 
items and then assess the respective disclosures for each item. 
An overview of the measurement approaches applied in previous empirical research into the 
relationship between CSD and CSP is provided in the appendix. Many of these studies distin-
guish between “monetary” or “hard” and “non-monetary” or “soft” disclosure items (Clarkson 
et al., 2008; Patten, 2002). Hard disclosure items focus on a firm’s disclosures related to envi-
ronmental performance indicators such as data on emissions, water use and recycling, where-
as soft disclosure items concentrate on the disclosure of a firm’s vision, environmental strate-
gy and commitment to environmentally responsible management. Because the disclosure 
items are observed on a binary basis (disclosure vs. non-disclosure), the overall disclosure 
score refers to the level (i.e., quantity) but not to the quality dimension (i.e., the shades of re-
porting between disclosure and non-disclosure) of CSD. In this case, an empirically testable 
distinction between VDT and LT is difficult.4 For instance, Clarkson et al. (2008) report a 
positive and significant relationship between environmental performance and environmental 
disclosure for all three disclosure categories (total, hard and soft disclosures). They interpret 
this finding as evidence for the application of VDT but refer to LT to explain additional “in-
teresting patterns in the data” (Clarkson et al., 2008, p. 323). Other measurement schemes are 
based on ordinal ratings and thus attempt to capture disclosure quality directly. In this case, a 
higher rating is typically assigned to quantitative disclosure, and a lower rating is assigned to 
non-quantitative disclosure (Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Aerts, Cormier, & Magnan, 2008; Al-
Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Wiseman, 1982). Because the overall disclosure score consists of a mix-
ture of quantitative and qualitative ratings for each item, both VDT and LT predict a positive 
relationship between CSP and CSD (Clarkson et al., 2011). Again, it is difficult to clearly dis-
tinguish between the applicability of each theory. 
                                                 
2 In May 2013, the G4 reporting standard was introduced. Because companies may begin applying it in report-
ing year 2013 at the earliest, the paper refers to reporting standard G3.1. In addition, the G4 standard is even 
more focused on materiality than the G3.1 standard (GRI, 2013). 
3 We do not include the economic dimension of sustainability because the reporting of key economic infor-
mation is mandatory and subject to national and international accounting standards. Moreover, the investiga-
tion of various aspects of mandatory and voluntary financial disclosure represents its own line of research (for 
an overview, see Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
4 A positive relationship between environmental performance and hard disclosure can support both VDT (better 
environmental performance is related to more hard disclosure) and LT (worse environmental performance is 
related to less hard disclosure). Similarly, a negative relationship between environmental performance and 
soft disclosure can support both VDT (better environmental performance is related to less soft disclosure) and 
LT (worse environmental performance is related to more soft disclosure). 
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Against this background, we provide a measurement scheme for CSD that concentrates on the 
quality instead of the quantity of CSD. Our index of relevant disclosure items is closely linked 
to the performance indicators required by GRI guidelines version 3.1. We focus on disclosure 
items that are required to be disclosed numerically. For each disclosure item, the GRI guide-
lines provide a precise description of all information that must be disclosed by a company. 
Each sustainability category ‒ environmental and social ‒ consists of seven performance indi-
cators that must be disclosed according to GRI G3.1. These are classified by the GRI as core 
indicators that are generally applicable and relevant for most companies (GRI, 2011a). For 
each of the respective disclosure items, exactly one point is awarded for quantitative (higher 
quality) disclosure, qualitative (lower quality) disclosure or non-disclosure. We define quanti-
tative (higher quality) disclosure as the disclosure of numerical data on a company-wide level 
that fulfill or exceed the requirements derived from GRI G3.1 and described in Table 1. If 
these requirements are not fulfilled, but any type of quantitative, qualitative or mixed infor-
mation is presented, one point is awarded for qualitative (lower quality) disclosure. When 
there is no information at all the item is classified as not reported. We include sector-specific 
adjustments for the quantitative (higher quality) requirements in the environmental category 
to account for industry-specific variations in the relevance of specific disclosure items. An 
example is presented in the footnote.5 Quantitative (qualitative) disclosure scores are calculat-
ed as the sum of all quantitative (qualitative) disclosure item scores and range between zero 
(minimum) and 14 (maximum). 
Because the differentiation between quantitative, qualitative and non-disclosure refers to the 
same disclosure items, our measurement scheme for CSD quality enables an empirically test-
able distinction between the applicability of VDT and LT. The reliability of our measure is 
supported by detailed descriptions of the disclosure items and measurement procedures. 
Moreover, the definition of each disclosure item is also provided by GRI G3.1 and is availa-
ble to the disclosing companies. Concentrating on relevant disclosure items strengthens the 
validity of our measurement scheme. Thus, our measurement scheme enables the measure-
ment of a company’s preference for quantitative (higher quality) versus qualitative (lower 
quality) disclosure, but it does not provide a full assessment of all areas of CSD (i.e., the 
quantity of CSD). By including an environmental and social category of CSD, we account for 
the criterion of multi-dimensionality. The congruence criterion is discussed in the next section 
along with the measurement scheme for CSP.  
                                                 
5 For example, reporting element R-E7 in Table 1 requires all companies except those belonging to the industry 
groups 13 to 15 to report their total waste weight by type and by disposal method. A chemical company may 
report the following: “Our total amount of waste is 100,000 tons that are split up into 30,000 tons of hazard-
ous waste and 70,000 tons of non-hazardous waste. 10% of our waste is recycled and 90% is sent to landfills.” 
This statement satisfies the minimum criteria for R-E7 and is therefore coded as quantitative (higher quality) 
disclosure. If only the first sentence were reported it would be coded as qualitative (lower quality) disclosure, 
although some quantitative information is given. For the same indicator R-E7 an insurance company (industry 
group 14) is only required to report the total amount of its waste without details about waste types and dispos-
al methods to be coded as quantitative (higher quality). 
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Table 1: Measurement scheme for corporate sustainability disclosure (CSD) quality 
Code Disclosure item Requirements for quantitative (higher quality) score GRI G3.1 
Environmental dimension
R-E1 materials used all substantial input materials by weight or volumea EN1 
R-E2 energy consumption 
and renewables 
direct and indirect energy consumption, share of renewable energy 
sourcesb 
EN3/4 
R-E3 water withdrawal total withdrawal by sourcec EN8 
R-E4 greenhouse gas 
emissions 
total direct and indirect emissions (GHG protocol scopes 1, 2, and 3) EN16/17 
R-E5 ozone-depleting 
substances and other 
air emissions 
total emissions of ozone-depleting substances; other significant air 
emissions by type and weight for at least one substance; alternatively, 
an explicit statement of irrelevance for bothd 
EN19/20 
R-E6 water discharge total discharge by quality (emissions to water by type and weight for 
at least one substance; alternatively, an explicit statement of irrele-
vance) and destinatione 
EN21 
R-E7 waste total weight by type and disposal methodf EN22 
   maximum environmental score is 7  
Social dimension 
R-S1 workforce total workforce based on at least three criteria (division, region, em-
ployment type, employment contract, qualification, age or gender) 
LA1 
R-S2 employee turnover total number of employees leaving for any reason (not for a single rea-
son only) 
LA2 
R-S3 collective bargaining 
agreements 
percentage of total workforce covered by collective bargaining agree-
ments 
LA4 
R-S4 safety and health work safety and health based on at least two criteria (rates of injury, 
occupational diseases, lost days, absenteeism, fatalities) 
LA7 
R-S5 training training (or related) time LA10 
R-S6 discrimination total number of incidents or explicit statement that no incidents oc-
curred (no indirect paraphrasing or references to codes of conduct) 
HR4 
R-S7 child, forced, and 
compulsory labor 
scope and numerical results of audits (within company or supply 
chain) regarding at least one aspect 
HR6/7 
   maximum social score is 7   
a Adjustments for industry groups 13 to 15 (see description in Table 3): use of paper is sufficient. 
b Adjustments for industry group 12 (see description in Table 3): share of renewable energy sources is excluded. 
 Adjustments for industry group 18 (see description in Table 3): share of renewable energy produced. 
c Adjustments for industry groups 4 to 6 and 13 to 15 (see description in Table 3): by source is excluded. 
d Adjustments for industry groups 4 to 6 and 13 to 15 (see description in Table 3): ozone-depleting substances or 
other significant air emissions. 
e Adjustments for industry groups 4 to 6 and 13 to 15 (see description in Table 3): by quality and destination is 
excluded. 
f Adjustments for industry groups 13 to 15 (see description in Table 3): by type and disposal method is excluded. 
Table 1 presents the indicators for the assessment of quantitative (higher quality) and qualitative (lower quality) 
CSD with respect to the environmental and social reporting dimension. The first two columns contain the respec-
tive disclosure items. Column three presents requirements that are defined for quantitative (higher quality) dis-
closure. The fourth column indicates the link to GRI G3.1 (GRI, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d). 
CSP measurement scheme 
The appendix provides measurement approaches for CSP that have been applied in previous 
empirical studies on the relationship between CSD and CSP. Some studies are based on one 
or two indicators – such as emissions or waste ‒ as proxies for overall environmental perfor-
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mance (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008). Such an approach is likely to miss the 
required level of validity. Other studies rely on a wide range of different emission indicators 
from publically available registers. For instance, Horváthová’s (2012) data stem from the Eu-
ropean Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (E-PRTR), which is limited to industrial facil-
ities. In this case, emissions outside a specific region (e.g., Europe) are not covered and the 
validity of this measurement approach with respect to international companies is thus ques-
tionable. There are also studies that utilize rating metrics provided by external agencies (Cho 
& Patten, 2007; Cho et al., 2006; Dawkins & Fraas, 2011). One of the most widely used rat-
ings is the KLD (today, the MSCI) rating which is based on binary data for 14 items, in which 
the respective environmental performance of a company is assessed in terms of “strengths” 
and “weaknesses” (Chatterji, Levine, & Toffel, 2009). Researchers typically derive a total 
score as a measure of environmental performance by subtracting the total weaknesses from 
the total strengths. Although this approach is not constrained by focusing exclusively on a 
single environmental performance indicator, the ratings process is not fully transparent. In 
particular, the criteria and threshold levels for the binary assessment are not revealed. There-
fore, the reliability cannot be evaluated from an outsider’s perspective. Moreover, the binary 
assessment insufficiently accounts for substantial variances in the underlying data. As a con-
sequence, researchers have repeatedly questioned the appropriateness of the KLD database for 
purposes of academic research (Chin, Hambrick, & Treviño, 2013; Chiu & Sharfman, 2011) 
and have called for the development of an improved measure of CSP (Hong & Andersen, 
2011). 
We heed this call and develop a more refined measure of CSP. To ensure content-based con-
gruence between the CSD quality and CSP measurement schemes, our indicators for CSP are 
derived from the disclosure items of CSD. If there are several performance indicators for a 
single disclosure item (e.g., R-S4), we focus on the most important in terms of environmental 
and social performance. Moreover, the selection of our indicators accounts for the compara-
bility and availability of the respective data within and across industry groups. Table 2 pro-
vides an overview of the performance indicators, the measurements of these indicators, the 
units of measurement and the corresponding CSD items. The measurement scheme consists of 
four environmental and four social performance indicators. Each indicator is precisely meas-
ured as defined in Table 2. If available, we directly refer to the data provided by the respective 
company. If data are provided only for certain countries, business areas or employee groups 
but cover at least 80% of total sales or total employees, we extrapolate the data to the entire 
corporation. If data are unreported, the respective performance indicator for the company con-
tains a missing value, and companies with more than two missing values in one dimension are 
excluded from the sample. Moreover, performance indicators can contain valid values even 
when the corresponding disclosure items are of lower quality and coded as qualitative.6 
                                                 
6 For example, a chemical company may exclusively report its total waste weight and be coded as qualitative 
(lower quality) for reporting element R-E7 because further information about the types of waste and disposal 
methods is missing. Nevertheless, the information requirement for the corresponding performance indicator P-
E4 (total weight of waste) is met. 
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Table 2: Measurement scheme for corporate sustainability performance (CSP) 
Code Performance indicator Measurement Unit CSD link 
Environmental dimension 
P-E1 energy consumption (direct + indirect energy consumption) 
/ number of employeesa 
MWh / 
employee 
R-E2 
P-E2 water withdrawal (total water withdrawal – cooling water) 
/ number of employeesa 
m3 / 
employee 
R-E3 
P-E3 greenhouse gas emissions (GHG protocol scope 1 + scope 2 emissions) 
/ number of employeesa 
t /  
employee 
R-E4 
P-E4 total weight of waste total weight of waste 
/ number of employeesa 
t /  
employee 
R-E7 
Social dimension 
P-S1 employee turnover total number of employeesa who leave 
/ number of employeesa * 100 
percent R-S2 
P-S2 lost time incident rate number of incidents resulting in lost time 
from work / (total hours worked / 200,000) 
incidents / 
h 
R-S4 
P-S3 employee training total training time 
/ number of employeesa 
h /  
employee 
R-S5 
P-S4 share of women in the highest 
corporate bodies2 
total number of women in the highest corporate 
bodiesb / total number of members of the highest 
corporate bodiesb * 100 
percent R-S6 
a If available, full-time equivalents; headcount otherwise. 
b Management board and supervisory board for two-tier system countries; board of directors for one-tier system 
countries. 
Table 2 presents the indicators for the measurement of CSP with respect to the environmental and social dimen-
sions. Columns one and two contain indicator names and brief descriptions. Columns three and four present for-
mulas for calculations and the units of measurement. The last column indicates how CSP measurement is linked 
to CSD quality measurement in Table 1. 
The original data for each indicator are arranged by industry groups and then winsorized with-
in each industry group at the top and bottom tails at a 10% level to limit the influence of out-
liers (Tukey, 1962).7 Next, all values are transformed into a continuous [0, 1] scale per indus-
try group by assigning “0” to the worst and “1” to the best performance indicator values and 
by rescaling all other values proportionally. Thus, this step allows all performance indicators 
with their differing measurement units to be aggregated into a total performance score. A min-
imum of five companies per industry group is required to define reasonable peer groups. 
Rescaling on an industry group basis simplifies the comparison of performance scores within 
these groups and improves the distribution characteristics of the CSP variable.8 Our final CSP 
                                                 
7 Due to fundamental differences in the data gathering procedure of our study compared with previous studies, 
we expect a higher likelihood of spurious outliers for our performance indicators. Such spurious outliers may 
result from the conversion and extrapolation of raw data (undertaken by both the reporting firms themselves 
and the authors). 
8 The natural differences in absolute environmental indicator values across industry groups may otherwise 
complicate the analysis of the relationship between CSP and CSD. For example, all mining companies would 
score very low and in a narrow bandwidth in terms of environmental performance, although some are much 
better than others within their class. Similarly, insurance firms would typically score very high and also in a 
narrow bandwidth, although some firms are clearly performing worse than others in their class. Other re-
searchers use the rank of performance data within each industry group as a proxy for a firm’s environmental 
performance (Clarkson, Fang, Li, & Richardson, 2013; Clarkson, Li, & Richardson, 2004; Clarkson et al., 
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score is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the means of the environmental and social per-
formance indicators. Each performance indicator is therefore weighted equally and missing 
values are approximated by the average of the remaining indicators within each dimension. 
Our measurement scheme contains essential and well-known performance indicators that are 
transparently defined and thus supports the criterion of reliability. The scheme also avoids 
oversimplification and largely satisfies the criterion of validity. Because the chosen perfor-
mance indicators are highly relevant, we mitigate the limitation that we cannot account for all 
the environmental and social impacts of the sample firms. Content-based congruence between 
the CSD quality and CSP measurement schemes and their multi-dimensionality are ensured 
because all key indicators of the CSD measurement scheme are also included in the CSP 
measurement scheme. Moreover, the criterion of relevance is fulfilled because the perfor-
mance indicators derive from the GRI guidelines, which are widely considered the most 
commonly used international sustainability reporting standard at present (Ballou, Heitger, & 
Landes, 2006; Gray, 2006; KPMG, 2011). 
Sample and methodological approach 
The initial sample consists of 388 companies that are included in the Bloomberg European 
500 index in January 2013 and are located in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land or the United Kingdom. Between February and August 2013, English versions of the 
corporate sustainability reports, if any, the annual report and any web-based sustainability 
disclosures by the sample firms for reporting year 2011 were identified. The authors manually 
assessed the CSD of each company according to the measurement scheme and recorded the 
data relevant for evaluating its CSP.9 Of the companies initially in our sample, 151 were ex-
cluded because they had more than two missing performance values in one dimension (or 
both dimensions). An additional 42 companies were excluded because each industry group is 
required to have at least five companies to allow for meaningful comparisons with peers. Ta-
ble 3 shows the final sample of 195 companies from seven countries and 19 industry groups. 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
2008) at the cost of inter-company variance in the respective data. Another approach is to limit the sample to 
certain types of industries. Several studies focus on firms in environmentally sensitive industries because en-
vironmental performance and environmental disclosure can be more important to firms operating in these in-
dustries (Cho et al., 2012; Cho & Patten, 2007; Cho et al., 2006; Clarkson et al., 2008; Clarkson et al., 2011). 
9 The sample was divided into two groups, and each author coded one group. All uncertainties were discussed 
and resolved by consensus. 
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Table 3: Sample distribution by country and by industry group 
By country n  By industry group n 
1 France 44 1 chemicals 10 
2 Germany 28 2  building materials, paper, steel 16 
3 Italy 16 3 mining 11 
4 Spain 27 4 advertising, entertainment, media 11 
5 Sweden 13 5 telecommunication 11 
6 Switzerland 14 6 computers and software 5 
7 United Kingdom 53 7 car manufacturers 8 
  8  retail 5 
  9 food and beverages 9 
  10 commercial services 7 
  11 pharmaceuticals 8 
  12  oil and gas 8 
  13 banking and financial services 30 
  14 insurance 10 
  15 REITS 10 
  16  aerospace and defense 8 
  17  engineering and construction 11 
  18  electricity 7 
  19  gas, water, and electricity distribution 10 
Total 195 Total 195 
The relationship between CSD quality and CSP along with control variables is assessed by 
running the following regression models. CSDquan refers to the level of quantitative (high 
quality) CSD and CSDqual refers to the level of qualitative (low quality) CSD. 
CSDquan = 0 + 1 CSP + 2 ASSURE + 3 ORG + 4 SIZE + 5 FCF + 6 LEV + 7 TOBIN 
+ ∑ βii=14i=8 	COUNTRY + ∑ βjj=33j=15 	INDUSTRY 
CSDqual = 0 + 1 CSP + 2 ASSURE + 3 ORG + 4 SIZE + 5 FCF + 6 LEV + 7 TOBIN 
+ ∑ βii=14i=8 	COUNTRY + ∑ βjj=33j=15 	INDUSTRY + 
Control variables 
We rely on previous research into the determinants of voluntary non-financial disclosure to 
select our control variables. For instance, Fifka (2013) provides a comprehensive overview. 
All the variables are summarized in Table 4 and are described in greater detail below. First, 
we control for a company’s strategic orientation toward sustainability issues, which derives 
from the strategic management literature (Ullmann, 1985). We draw on external assurance 
(ASSURE) and the hierarchical level of the internal organizational units focused on corporate 
sustainability (ORG) as proxies for strategic orientation. We argue that an active strategic ori-
entation supports the disclosure of credible sustainability-related information, and we thus 
expect to find a positive (negative) effect on CSDquan (CSDqual). Our variable ASSURE in-
dicates whether a company’s CSD is assured by an external company. Previous research has 
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shown that obtaining external assurance is associated with the strategic integration of sustain-
ability initiatives (Abdel-Khalik, 1993; Knechel, Salterio, & Ballou, 2007). We assume that 
only companies with an active strategic orientation toward sustainability bear the extra costs 
of external assurance to demonstrate commitment and credibility. Our variable ORG is meas-
ured on a four-point rating scale as shown in Table 4. Previous researchers argue that sustain-
ability reporting requires specific reporting processes and structures (Adams, 2002; Al-
Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Ballou, Casey, Grenier, & Heitger, 2012; Ruhnke & Gabriel, 2013). The 
hierarchical level of sustainability-related internal organizational units signals the importance 
that a company attaches to sustainability (Cowen, Ferreri, & Parker, 1987) and thus indicates 
the intensity of a firm’s strategic orientation toward sustainability. 
We also control for firm size (SIZE) because nearly all previous empirical studies show the 
impact of firm size on CSD (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Clarkson et al., 2008; Clarkson et 
al., 2011; Cormier, Magnan, & van Velthoven, 2005; Dawkins & Fraas, 2011; Kolk, 2003; 
Patten, 2002). One explanation for this effect focuses on economies of scale with respect to 
information production costs (Clarkson et al., 2008). Another argument refers to firm size as a 
proxy for other factors, primarily public visibility (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Dawkins & 
Fraas, 2011) and the extent of monitoring by analysts (Cormier et al., 2005). In either case, a 
positive relationship between SIZE and a proxy for overall disclosure can be expected. Our 
measure of CSD quality is more refined. Thus, an increase in size may trigger firms to switch 
from non-disclosure to lower quality (CSDqual) or higher quality (CSDquan) disclosure, to 
switch from higher quality to lower quality disclosure (legitimacy theory and increased public 
visibility) or the reverse (stronger demand from analysts). Because those three effects overlap 
and partially cancel one another out, no sign is predicted for the relationship between SIZE 
and CSDquan or CSDqual. We measure SIZE as the log of the number of employees at the 
end of the fiscal year because market capitalization is less stable over time and the book value 
of total assets or sales is less comparable across industries (e.g., banking and insurance). 
We use the free cash flow in million euros per employee (FCF) at the end of the fiscal year as 
a proxy for financial performance. One group of researchers (Ullmann, 1985) claims that a 
company’s financial performance determines its financial capacity to invest in and maintain 
CSD. In addition, these researchers argue that only financially sound companies are able to 
withstand the (negative) consequences of disclosing proprietary information (Cormier & 
Magnan, 2003; Cormier et al., 2005). Following this reasoning, the effect of financial perfor-
mance on CSDquan and CSDqual might be positive. By contrast Neu, Warsame, and Pedwell 
(1998) conclude that companies use environmental disclosures during unprofitable years to 
demonstrate long-term competitive advantages resulting from environmental investments and 
posit a negative relationship with financial performance. A third line of research (Patten, 
1991) assumes an indifferent relationship between a company’s financial performance and its 
social disclosures, arguing that social disclosure is primarily driven by social legitimacy rather 
than economic legitimacy. Against the background of these contradictory theoretical consid-
erations and inconsistent empirical results, we do not predict a sign for the relationship be-
tween financial performance and CSDquan or CSDqual. 
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Table 4: Variables overview 
 CSDquan 
predicted 
sign 
CSDqual 
predicted 
sign 
Description Source of data 
CSDquan   level of quantitative (higher quality) CSD for reporting 
year 2011, measured as described in Table 1 and in the 
“CSD quality measurement scheme” section 
manual 
CSDqual   level of qualitative (lower quality) CSD for reporting 
year 2011, measured as described in Table 1 and in the 
“CSD quality measurement scheme” section 
manual 
CSP + − level of CSP for reporting year 2011, measured as de-
scribed in Table 2 and in the “CSP measurement 
scheme” section 
manual 
ASSURE + − external assurance, equals “1” if a company’s CSD for 
reporting year 2011 is (at least partly) assured by an 
external company and “0” otherwise 
manual 
ORG + − highest hierarchical level of internal organizational 
units focused on corporate sustainability during the 
2011 reporting year, measured on a four-point rating 
scale: (1) a company’s corporate sustainability activities 
are supervised by only a few local stand-alone units 
with no superordinate organizational unit on the group 
level, (2) there is a specialized organizational unit de-
termining and supervising the corporate sustainability 
strategy for the entire group, (3) at least one member of 
this specialized organizational unit is a representative of 
the highest corporate bodies, (4) a main committee of 
the board of directors is dedicated to the firm’s corpo-
rate sustainability activities 
manual 
SIZE   firm size, measured as the log of total employees at the 
end of fiscal year 2011 (full-time equivalents if availa-
ble, headcount otherwise) 
manual 
 
FCF   financial performance, measured as the free cash flow 
(cash flow from operating activities − total capital ex-
penditures) in million euros per employee at the end of 
fiscal year 2011 (full-time equivalents if available, 
headcount otherwise) 
Bloomberg
LEV + − financial leverage (average total assets / average total 
common equity) 
Bloomberg
TOBIN + − Tobin’s Q, measured as (market value common equity 
+ book value long-term debt and current liabilities) / 
book value total assets at the end of fiscal year 2011 
Bloomberg
COUNTRY   country of domicile dummy variables as reported in 
Table 3, and the reference category is the UK 
Bloomberg
INDUSTRY   industry group dummy variables as reported in Table 3, 
and the reference category is banking and financial ser-
vices 
Bloomberg/ 
manual 
We also include the financial leverage of a company (LEV) as a proxy for the informational 
needs of a company’s creditors. Financial leverage is measured as average total assets divided 
by average total common equity. It can be assumed that the monitoring demand for infor-
mation by a company’s creditors increases with its leverage (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; 
Clarkson et al., 2011) and that creditors are interested in a company’s CSP because CSP indi-
cates future potential risks related to sustainability issues. Moreover, certain researchers argue 
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that superior CSP is essential for a company’s long-term economic success and existence 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Porter & Kramer, 2011; Russo & Fouts, 1997). Thus, higher-
leveraged companies are more dependent on creditor demands and have greater incentive to 
inform creditors of their true CSP type (Roberts, 1992; Ullmann, 1985). Because quantitative 
(higher quality) disclosure is assumed to be more reliable and comparable, we expect to find a 
positive (negative) effect for financial leverage on CSDquan (CSDqual). 
Next, we include Tobin’s Q (TOBIN) in our models as another control variable. Tobin’s Q is 
measured as a firm’s market value relative to the replacement cost of its assets and is used to 
capture information asymmetry (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008; Clarkson et 
al., 2011; Stanny & Ely, 2008). A higher Tobin’s Q reflects a greater degree of information 
asymmetry. Following the literature on voluntary (financial) disclosure, information asym-
metry between a company’s managers and outside investors is assumed to be the major source 
of demand for (financial) disclosure (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Consequently, managers strive 
to decrease information asymmetry through additional disclosure. Because investors prefer 
quantitative information to qualitative information, we predict a positive (negative) effect of 
information asymmetry on CSDquan (CSDqual). 
We also include country and industry group dummies as control variables. A number of em-
pirical studies have revealed systematic, country-specific variations in firm CSD that may 
arise from regulatory, cultural, and societal differences (Fekrat, Inclan, & Petroni, 1996; Kolk, 
2003; Kolk, Walhain, & van de Wateringen, 2001; Orij, 2010; van der Laan Smith, Adhikari, 
& Tondkar, 2005). Such differences are closely linked to legitimacy theory because the defi-
nition and understanding of legitimacy vary across different societies. In this context, van der 
Laan Smith et al. (2005) refer to the stakeholder versus shareholder orientation of a country. 
However, because regulatory, cultural and societal differences interfere with one another and 
cannot be clearly disentangled, we include firms’ countries of domicile as control variables to 
capture such differences.10 Additionally, industry group dummies are included to account for 
industry-specific effects on CSD. Such industry-specific effects have been demonstrated by a 
substantial number of previous empirical studies (Cho & Patten, 2007; Dawkins & Fraas, 
2011; Patten, 2002; Roberts, 1992). As with firm size, some researchers argue that industry 
affiliation serves as a proxy for public visibility and political scrutiny (Branco & Rodrigues, 
2008; Cho et al., 2012; Cho & Patten, 2007; Roberts, 1992). Other researchers refer to the 
general institutional context to explain industry-specific reporting patterns (Cormier et al., 
                                                 
10 We examine the country-specific regulatory background for our sample firms for 2011 with respect to the 
voluntary character of our disclosure items and find no evidence that our CSD measurement scheme is signif-
icantly biased through national regulations. We identify three countries with detailed regulations on sustaina-
bility reporting: France, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, carbon reporting has been 
mandatory since 2013 (Companies Act 2006 Regulations 2013). In Sweden, sustainability reporting in ac-
cordance with GRI guidelines is only required for state-owned companies, and such companies are not in-
cluded in our sample (Guidelines for external reporting by state-owned companies, 2007). The reporting on 
some of our disclosure items is mandatory for firms in 2011 only in France (Decree 2002-221 and the Order 
of April 30, 2002; further requirements by Articles 75 and 225 of Grenelle II came into force in 2012). How-
ever, these French regulations do not necessarily entail quantitative disclosure as defined by our CSD meas-
urement scheme. In addition, some European companies are obligated to report emissions data to the central 
European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (E-PRTR). Nevertheless, the required data do not cover fa-
cilities outside the European Union. 
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2005; Patten, 2002) and argue that firms tend to compare themselves with intra-industry peers 
and adjust their reporting behavior accordingly. In addition, both the level of discretion and 
the level of data sensitivity can vary significantly across industry groups. Therefore, we con-
trol for these industry-specific effects by inserting dummy variables for industry groups in our 
models. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive results 
Panel A of Table 5 presents the percentage of disclosing companies for each reporting item by 
superior and poor sustainability performers and for the full sample. For the full sample, mini-
mum and maximum values are defined by R-S1 and R-S7. The highest proportion of quantita-
tive disclosure (88%), the lowest proportion of qualitative disclosure (12%) and non-
disclosure (0%) refer to R-S1, whereas the lowest proportion of quantitative disclosure (7%) 
and the highest proportion of qualitative disclosure (72%) refer to R-S7. In addition, the high-
est proportion of non-disclosure is related to R-E6. Across all indicators, approximately 50% 
of the companies on average opt for quantitative disclosure, whereas 38% (12%) opt for quali-
tative (non-)disclosure. Moreover, social reporting items are reported quantitatively more fre-
quently than environmental reporting items. A similar distribution is obtained for the subsam-
ples of superior and poor sustainability performers. For most reporting items, the proportion 
of quantitatively (qualitatively) disclosing firms is higher (lower) for superior sustainability 
performers than for poor sustainability performers, which is consistent with our expectations. 
However, both superior and poor sustainability performers report more quantitatively than 
qualitatively on average across all indicators. 
Panel B of Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics on CSDquan and CSDqual by industry 
group. On average, quantitative (higher quality) disclosure is lowest for the ‘retail’ industry 
and highest for the ‘electricity’ industry, whereas qualitative (lower quality) disclosure is low-
est for ‘banking and financial services’ and highest for the ‘retail’ industry. There is one firm 
that exclusively provides quantitative reporting (a car manufacturer) and one firm that does 
not disclose any reporting item quantitatively (a media company), but no firm discloses each 
reporting item qualitatively. On average, most industries use quantitative reporting to a great-
er extent than qualitative reporting, with the exception of ‘building materials, paper, steel’, 
‘mining’, ‘retail’, ‘commercial services’, ‘aerospace and defense’, and ‘engineering and con-
struction’. In general, reporting behavior is heterogeneous across industry groups, which sup-
ports the need to control for industry-specific effects. 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics for CSDquan and CSDqual by indicator and by industry group  
Panel A: Percentage of quantitatively/qualitatively disclosing companies per indicator 
  CSDquan CSDqual non-disclosure 
  total sup poor total sup poor total sup poor
 observations 195 98 97 195 98 97 195 98 97
R-E1 materials used 40% 43% 37% 42% 39% 45% 18% 18% 18%
R-E2 energy consumption and renewables 39% 41% 38% 60% 58% 62% 1% 1% 0%
E-E3 water withdrawal 64% 68% 59% 30% 26% 34% 7% 6% 7%
R-E4 greenhouse gas emissions 55% 61% 49% 44% 38% 49% 1% 1% 1%
R-E5 ozone-depleting substances and other air emissions 42% 43% 41% 27% 23% 31% 31% 34% 28%
R-E6 water discharge 11% 9% 12% 47% 47% 47% 42% 44% 40%
R-E7 waste 49% 54% 44% 46% 40% 53% 5% 6% 3%
 mean environmental 43% 46% 40% 42% 39% 46% 15% 16% 14%
R-S1 workforce 88% 87% 89% 12% 13% 11% 0% 0% 0%
R-S2 employee turnover 67% 65% 69% 21% 21% 20% 12% 13% 11%
R-S3 collective bargaining agreements 50% 51% 48% 34% 35% 33% 16% 14% 19%
R-S4 safety and health 76% 83% 70% 21% 16% 26% 3% 1% 4%
R-S5 training 77% 80% 75% 22% 20% 24% 1% 0% 1%
R-S6 discrimination 32% 37% 28% 61% 57% 64% 7% 6% 8%
R-S7 child, forced, and compulsory labor 7% 8% 6% 72% 73% 71% 21% 18% 23%
 mean social 57% 59% 55% 35% 34% 35% 8% 8% 9%
 mean total 50% 52% 48% 38% 36% 41% 12% 12% 12%
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for CSDquan and CSDqual by industry group 
   CSDquan CSDqual 
  n mean sd min max mean sd min max
1 chemicals 10 7.90 1.85 5.00 11.00 5.50 1.78 3.00 9.00
2 building materials, paper, steel 16 6.38 3.28 1.00 12.00 6.56 2.45 2.00 10.00
3 mining 11 6.36 2.62 1.00 10.00 7.18 2.23 4.00 12.00
4 advertising, entertainment, media 11 5.73 3.23 0.00 11.00 5.82 2.36 2.00 10.00
5 telecommunication 11 8.18 2.68 4.00 12.00 3.55 1.37 2.00 6.00
6 computers and software 5 6.40 2.51 4.00 10.00 5.20 1.10 4.00 6.00
7 car manufacturers 8 8.13 3.44 3.00 14.00 5.38 2.92 0.00 10.00
8 retail 5 4.00 1.41 2.00 5.00 8.40 1.14 7.00 10.00
9 food and beverages 9 6.33 2.50 3.00 11.00 6.11 2.42 2.00 10.00
10 commercial services 7 5.00 2.89 3.00 11.00 6.71 2.21 3.00 10.00
11 pharmaceuticals 8 8.13 2.47 5.00 11.00 5.13 1.89 3.00 7.00
12 oil and gas 8 7.63 2.67 4.00 11.00 5.63 2.33 3.00 9.00
13 banking and financial services 30 8.67 2.52 3.00 13.00 3.43 1.52 1.00 7.00
14 insurance 10 7.40 2.67 4.00 11.00 4.60 1.96 2.00 9.00
15 REITS 10 5.30 1.89 2.00 8.00 4.60 0.70 4.00 6.00
16 aerospace and defense 8 5.13 1.55 3.00 7.00 6.63 2.13 4.00 11.00
17 engineering and construction 11 4.55 2.38 2.00 10.00 7.45 1.69 4.00 10.00
18 electricity 7 9.71 2.06 6.00 12.00 3.71 1.50 2.00 6.00
19 gas, water, and electricity distribution 10 7.70 2.71 4.00 11.00 5.30 2.31 2.00 9.00
For each reporting item, Panel A presents the percentage of superior and poor sustainability performers that re-
port quantitatively or qualitatively or that do not report. Superior sustainability performers (sup) are firms with 
CSP equal to or above the sample median. Poor sustainability performers (poor) are firms with CSP below the 
sample median. Panel B presents descriptive statistics for CSDquan (CSDqual) by industry group. 
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Panel A of Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression anal-
ysis. The mean value for CSDquan is higher than that of CSDqual, which indicates that on 
average sample firms slightly prefer quantitative (higher quality) to qualitative (lower quality) 
disclosure, as defined in Table 1 and in the “CSD measurement scheme” section. CSP varies 
between 0 and 1, with a mean value slightly above 0.5. Approximately 68% of the sample 
firms adopt a sustainability assurance statement, which is a rather high proportion compared 
with previous studies. For instance, using a panel of Fortune Global 250 firms for 2008, 
Perego and Kolk (2012) report that 56% of sustainability reports include assurance state-
ments. Because of fundamental differences between the litigation traditions of the European 
and U.S. markets, the deviation might stem from differences in sample composition, which is 
restricted to European companies in our study. The deviation may also be attributable to dif-
ferent observation periods because external assurance has become more commonly employed 
by large companies in recent years (KPMG, 2011). The mean of 2.49 for ORG corresponds to 
a percentage of 81% (untabulated) of the sample firms that run group-wide organizational 
structures to coordinate their corporate sustainability activities. This proportion exceeds the 
observations in previous studies (e.g. Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004, report 62% and Ruhnke and 
Gabriel, 2013, report 59%). However, these deviations likely originate from differing scales 
and definitions. Because SIZE is highly positively skewed, we employ log-transformations to 
the original data and report the log-transformed data. On average, our sample firms employ 
66,037 employees and are thus relatively large companies. Financial performance ‒ as meas-
ured by free cash flow on the basis of euro per employee ‒ measures approximately 0.03 on 
average, and the high standard deviation of financial leverage reflects the diversity of the 
sample with respect to different industry groups. 
Panel B of Table 6 presents the Pearson correlations between all variables in our models. As 
expected, there is a negative correlation between CSDquan and CSDqual, which indicates a 
close but not perfect relationship between these variables and the use of the non-disclosure 
option by sample firms. The correlation coefficient between CSP and CSDquan is positive 
(but not significant), whereas the correlation coefficient between CSP and CSDqual is nega-
tive (and significant). The predicted signs of our control variables are generally in accordance 
with the correlation statistics, except for TOBIN. As expected, there is a positive (negative) 
relationship between ASSURE and CSDquan (CSDqual), which indicates that companies with 
assured CSD disclose higher quality information. ORG is positively correlated with CSDquan, 
but the strength of this correlation is weak and there is no correlation between ORG and 
CSDqual. Moreover, ORG is positively (and significantly) correlated with both ASSURE and 
SIZE. The correlation coefficients of both SIZE and FCF are insignificant, which reflects the 
opposing theoretical considerations regarding these control variables. LEV is positively (nega-
tively) and significantly correlated with CSDquan (CSDqual). Counterintuitively, TOBIN is 
negatively (positively) correlated with CSDquan (CSDqual) and there is a negative correlation 
between ASSURE and TOBIN, which indicates that a lower degree of information asymmetry 
accompanies more quantitative CSD and external assurance, respectively. 
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Table 6: Descriptive and correlation statistics for regression variables 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 n mean median sd 25th percentile 
75th 
percentile 
(1) CSDquan 195 6.98 7.00 2.88 5.00 9.00 
(2) CSDqual 195 5.38 5.00 2.32 4.00 7.00 
(3) CSP 195 0.55 0.57 0.19 0.42 0.70 
(4) ASSURE 195 0.68 1.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
(5) ORG 195 2.49 2.00 1.10 2.00 4.00 
(6) SIZE 195 4.42 4.61 0.76 4.01 4.97 
(7) FCF 195 0.03 0.02 0.32 0.00 0.06 
(8) LEV 195 6.91 3.40 11.52 2.27 6.82 
(9) TOBIN 195 1.25 1.06 0.48 0.98 1.30 
 
Panel B: Correlation statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) 1.0000         
          
(2) −0.8042 1.0000        
 (0.0000)         
(3) 0.0974 −0.1187 1.0000       
 (0.1757) (0.0983)        
(4) 0.3991 −0.2165 −0.1004 1.0000      
 (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.1624)       
(5) 0.1319 0.0202 −0.0143 0.3151 1.0000     
 (0.0660) (0.7787) (0.8423) (0.0000)      
(6) 0.0753 0.1326 0.0612 0.2317 0.2370 1.0000    
 (0.2191) (0.0300) (0.3956) (0.0001) (0.0009)     
(7) 0.0525 −0.0458 0.1061 −0.0424 −0.0575 0.2150 1.0000   
 (0.3923) (0.4556) (0.1398) (0.4894) (0.4248) (0.0004)    
(8) 0.1439 −0.2227 0.0014 −0.0218 −0.1345 0.0109 0.1608 1.0000  
 (0.0184) (0.0002) (0.9850) (0.7219) (0.0608) (0.8596) (0.0083)   
(9) −0.1394 0.1349 0.0779 −0.1263 0.0440 −0.0695 0.0481 −0.2492 1.0000 
 (0.0225) (0.0273) (0.2791) (0.0387) (0.5414) (0.2570) (0.4332) (0.0000)  
(1) CSDquan, (2) CSDqual, (3) CSP, (4) ASSURE, (5) ORG, (6) SIZE, (7) FCF, (8) LEV, (9) TOBIN 
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics (Panel A) and correlation statistics (Panel B) for the variables used in the 
regression analysis. Statistics are presented for the full sample of 195 firms. Panel B reports bivariate Pearson 
correlation coefficients and p-values (in parentheses) for a two-tailed test of statistical significance. 
Results of the regression analyses 
The results of multivariate regression analyses with robust standard errors (White, 1980) are 
presented in Table 7. The first set of columns corresponds to hypothesis H1 (CSDquan), and 
the second set of columns corresponds to hypothesis H2 (CSDqual). For each hypothesis we 
present three models. Model (1) contains only our main variable of interest CSP along with 
ASSURE and ORG, which capture the strategic orientation toward sustainability issues. In 
model (2) we include all control variables except country and industry group dummies, 
whereas model (3) corresponds to our full model. 
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Table 7: Regression results 
CSDquan = 0 + 1 CSP + 2 ASSURE + 3 ORG + 4 SIZE + 5 FCF + 6 LEV + 7 TOBIN 
+ ∑ βii=14i=8 	COUNTRY + ∑ βjj=33j=15 	INDUSTRY 
CSDqual = 0 + 1 CSP + 2 ASSURE + 3 ORG + 4 SIZE + 5 FCF + 6 LEV + 7 TOBIN 
+ ∑ βii=14i=8 	COUNTRY + ∑ βjj=33j=15 	INDUSTRY +  
 CSDquan models CSDqual models 
  (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 3.6605*** 3.7827*** 3.5434* 6.7406*** 5.2248*** 5.0303*** 
 (4.6474) (2.6171) (1.8771) (9.8235) (4.3195) (3.2326) 
CSP (+/−) 2.6614** 2.7335** 3.3036*** −1.9094** −2.0598** −2.6497*** 
 (2.5332) (2.5697) (3.3144) (−2.0862) (−2.3139) (−3.2248) 
ASSURE (+/−) 2.5350*** 2.6020*** 2.1922*** −1.2620*** −1.4574*** −1.1729*** 
 (5.7187) (5.7167) (4.9277) (−3.2680) (−3.8263) (−3.1983) 
ORG (+/−) 0.0533 0.1401 0.2045 0.2051 0.0593 −0.0388 
 (0.2859) (0.7311) (1.0171) (1.2627) (0.3697) (−0.2340) 
SIZE  −0.1397 −0.1051  0.5887** 0.4521 
  (−0.4964) (−0.2986)  (2.4989) (1.5580) 
FCF  0.5415 −0.4773  −0.2333 0.1162 
  (0.8336) (−0.6984)  (−0.4291) (0.2062) 
LEV (+/−)  0.0409** 0.0141  −0.0622*** −0.0199 
  (2.2799) (0.6805)  (−4.1477) (−1.1681) 
TOBIN (+/−)  −0.0737 0.1696  −0.0396 −0.3283 
  (−0.1739) (0.3690)  (−0.1117) (−0.8667) 
Country 
dummies NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Industry group 
dummies NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Observations 195 195 195 195 195 195 
Adjusted R2 0.1648 0.1770 0.3635 0.0530 0.1407 0.3349 
F-Statistic 13.7628*** 6.96*** 4.5747*** 4.62*** 5.5382*** 4.1511*** 
Table 7 reports ordinary least squares coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) based on Huber-
White robust standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-
tailed), respectively. 
With respect to hypothesis H1, the results of the multivariate regression analysis suggest a 
positive and significant association between CSP and CSDquan in all three models. This re-
sult is consistent with the predictions derived from VDT and indicates that superior sustaina-
bility performers disclose sustainability information quantitatively (higher quality) rather than 
qualitatively (lower quality) because this type of information is more reliable and comparable. 
By disclosing primarily quantitative (higher quality) information, these companies actively 
reveal their superior performance type to the market and are therefore able to distinguish 
themselves from poor sustainability performers. With respect to our control variables, only 
ASSURE is significant in all models, and LEV is significant in the reduced model. In addition 
to sustainability performance, a company’s strategic orientation toward sustainability topics, 
which is captured by ASSURE and ORG, also has an impact on a company’s disclosure strate-
gy. Controlling for all other factors, companies with an active strategic posture more frequent-
ly opt for quantitative (higher quality) than qualitative (lower quality) disclosure. The insig-
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nificant results for SIZE and FCF may reflect the opposing theoretical considerations on the 
relationship between CSD and these control variables. With respect to SIZE, the insignificant 
finding might also be attributed to our sample, which consists of relatively large firms. The 
insignificant findings for FCF are prevalent in the literature (Clarkson et al., 2011; Dawkins 
& Fraas, 2011). Additionally, the positive relationship for LEV in the reduced model indicates 
that companies with higher leverage are more likely to disclose high quality CSD. Financial 
leverage is largely industry-specific and the change in significance for LEV from model (2) to 
model (3) may stem from the inclusion of industry group dummies. Finally, TOBIN is insig-
nificant, which is consistent with the prior literature (Clarkson et al., 2008; Clarkson et al., 
2011). 
The findings for hypothesis H2 reveal a negative and significant relationship between CSP 
and CSDqual (lower quality) in all three models. The reasoning of LT is supported, which 
indicates that poor sustainability performers disclose sustainability information qualitatively 
(lower quality) rather than quantitatively (higher quality) to manipulate public perceptions 
regarding their CSP. Because lower quality information typically lacks reliability and compa-
rability, it is particularly useful for disguising a company’s poor sustainability performance 
while still contributing to a sustainable company image. With respect to the control variables, 
ASSURE is significant in all models, whereas SIZE and LEV are significant in the reduced 
model. The negative result for ASSURE is evidence that a passive strategic orientation toward 
sustainability issues results in predominantly qualitative disclosures. Similar to our multivari-
ate results on CSDquan, this relationship holds for the existence of external control mecha-
nisms (ASSURE) and is insignificant for internal organizational structures (ORG). We observe 
a positive relationship between SIZE and CSDqual in the reduced model, which indicates that 
an increase in firm size might be associated with more qualitative disclosures, which is con-
sistent with the reasoning of LT. In accordance with the prior literature, the relationship be-
tween FCF and CSDqual is insignificant. Consistent with our expectations, we observe a neg-
ative coefficient for LEV in the reduced model, which indicates that creditors may be less 
willing to accept qualitative (lower quality) information and may require higher levels of 
transparency with an increase in financial leverage. Finally, the relationship between TOBIN 
and CSDqual remains insignificant in all models. 
Supplemental analyses 
We perform several variations to assess the robustness of our findings. First, we rerun the 
models using alternative proxies for firm size and financial performance. We use a log-
transformation of market capitalization as an alternative proxy for firm size and both return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) for financial performance. The F-statistics and sig-
nificance of the regression models – in addition to the direction and significance of the inde-
pendent variables – are similar to those of the initial model, which supports the stability of our 
model (untabulated results). Second, we divide our sample into poor and superior sustainabil-
ity performers based on median CSP. In accordance with our hypotheses, the mean value of 
CSDquan (CSDqual) is significantly higher (lower) for superior sustainability performers (t-
tests of means, significance levels one-tailed, results untabulated). Third, we check the ro-
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bustness of our results with respect to the winsorization of our original CSP data. In our base-
line models, CSP data are winsorized at the 10% level. Although the winsorization procedure 
limits the influence of spurious outliers, it also reduces the variance in our raw data and its 
originality. Therefore, we rerun our models with CSP data winsorized at the 5% level and at 
the 1% level, and our results are similar to those of the initial model. In particular, both the 
direction and significance of the CSP variable remain unchanged. Thus, the results obtained 
are not significantly influenced by our handling of spurious outliers (results untabulated). 
Finally, we account for the problem of missing data for certain performance indicators in the 
sample. According to our measurement scheme for CSP, these missing values are replaced 
with the mean values of the remaining indicators for each dimension. Following LT, it can be 
assumed that this approach might weaken the results of our study because poor performance 
values, in particular, are generally unreported. However, theoretical considerations might be 
misleading, and some firms may also have unobserved incentives to withhold the disclosure 
of superior performance data. To assess the robustness of our results with respect to missing 
values, we cover a wide range of possible scenarios using the Monte Carlo simulation method 
(Metropolis & Ulam, 1949). Beginning with winsorized original data, missing values are re-
placed by simulated values.11 The simulated values are randomly drawn from a uniform dis-
tribution and separately rescaled for each industry group within an interval of [0.8*minimum 
per industry; 1.2*maximum per industry]. The additional range of 20% accounts for the pos-
sibility that missing data constitute unobserved extremes in our sample. The subsequent data 
rescaling and aggregation procedure is identical to our original method. The new dataset con-
taining observed and simulated values is used to run our main regression models to test hy-
pothesis 1 (hypothesis 2). The procedure of random sampling, data aggregation and hypothe-
sis testing is repeated 100,000 times, and the results are presented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Results from the Monte Carlo simulation for the CSP coefficients 
Each mark represents a simulated regression coefficient and the corresponding p-value for 
CSDquan (left side) and CSDqual (right side). For all simulated scenarios, the signs of the 
regression coefficients for CSP remain positive (negative). With respect to CSDquan, 98.02% 
of all scenarios yield statistically significant results at the 1% level (1.97% at the 5% level and 
0.01% at the 10% level). There is no scenario with insignificant results, which is indicated by 
                                                 
11 Specifically, 96.21% (254/264) of the missing values are simulated. Ten gaps in P-S2 remain in the insurance 
industry because no data are provided. 
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the broken line in Figure 1. For CSDqual, 82.18% of all scenarios are significant at the 1% 
level (17.54% at the 5% level and 0.28% at the 10% level). In this case, only 0.01% of the 
results from all scenarios are insignificant (marks above the broken line). Overall, the results 
of the Monte Carlo simulation comprehensively support the robustness of our findings with 
respect to missing performance values in our data. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Recent research points toward an overlap between VDT and LT in explaining the sustainabil-
ity reporting behavior of firms. Although previous studies contain preliminary support for this 
reasoning, there is an absence of robust empirical evidence in the literature. Our paper fills 
this research gap and thereby extends the prior literature in various ways. First, by concentrat-
ing on CSD quality instead of CSD quantity we are able to show the simultaneous applicabil-
ity of predictions derived from both VDT and LT. In accordance with the reasoning of VDT, 
we argue that superior sustainability performers disclose sustainability information quantita-
tively rather than qualitatively because quantitative information is more reliable and compara-
ble. In addition, we build on the reasoning of LT and predict a negative relationship between 
CSP and qualitative (lower quality) CSD because poor sustainability performers prefer to 
make lower quality disclosures to protect their image as sustainable firms. Second, our study 
expands the scope of previous studies that have focused exclusively on the environmental di-
mension of sustainability by also accounting for the social dimension. In this manner, we also 
respond to the call of several researchers and present improved measurement approaches for 
both CSP and CSD quality. We distinguish between quantitative (higher quality) disclosure, 
qualitative (lower quality) disclosure and non-disclosure for seven environmental and seven 
social disclosure items and aggregate the values into a total score for quantitative (higher 
quality), qualitative (lower quality) and non-disclosure. CSP is measured by four correspond-
ing environmental and four corresponding social performance indicators. We refer directly to 
the data provided by our sample companies and aggregate these data into an overall perfor-
mance score on an industry group basis. Third, the results from multivariate analyses of hand-
collected data from 195 publicly traded European companies corroborate our theoretical rea-
soning. We observe a positive relationship between CSP and quantitative (higher quality) 
CSD and a negative relationship between CSP and qualitative (lower quality) CSD. The ro-
bustness of these findings is supported by several supplemental analyses. Additionally, our 
analysis provides insights into other determinants of CSD quality, which indicate that the dis-
tinction between quantitative (higher quality) and qualitative (lower quality) CSD prevails, in 
particular, with respect to an active strategic orientation toward sustainability and financial 
leverage.  
In addition to the contributions to the academic literature, our study also has practical implica-
tions. First, the results reveal that there is currently not only a problem of non-reporting – as 
has been noted in criticism from institutional investors – but also a problem of different re-
porting qualities. To ensure the comparability of reported data, a precise and binding regulato-
ry framework for the contents of sustainability reports is necessary. The development of such 
a framework would facilitate the external assessment of a company’s sustainability perfor-
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mance and its comparison with other peer companies. Second, in contrast to previous studies, 
findings from our study emphasize the importance of not only the environmental but also the 
social dimension of sustainability for the general public and the capital markets. Companies 
must be aware of the increasing importance of social disclosure and must also be prepared to 
provide relevant and high quality information. 
The results of this paper are subject to certain limitations. First, the generalizability of our 
findings depends on the sample and time period of our study. To provide recent empirical re-
sults, we concentrate on the 2011 reporting period. Potential bias may arise from the sample 
composition of our study, which predominantly consists of large and publicly listed compa-
nies. Therefore, our results may not hold for small firms and/or firms less oriented to the capi-
tal markets. A second caveat of our study is linked to the problem of non-reporting compa-
nies. Our CSP measurement scheme requires that a company reveals performance data; as a 
consequence, our results cannot account for companies excluded from the sample because of 
insufficient data. Biases may also arise from companies that were included and partly with-
held data. Nevertheless, results from a Monte Carlo simulation of these missing performance 
values do not indicate reasonable concerns with respect to the robustness of our initial find-
ings. 
Finally, our paper suggests directions for future empirical research. Our measures of CSD 
quality and CSP can be employed to analyze various questions that remain open in the field of 
sustainability disclosure. For instance, the results of our study provide preliminary evidence 
regarding the relevance of high quality sustainability disclosure for capital market partici-
pants. A different research design is necessary to test whether high quality CSD is indeed ap-
praised by capital market participants and whether it affects firm value.12 The results from 
previous investigations on the value relevance of CSD in general (Clarkson et al., 2013; 
Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang, & Yang, 2012) may be confounded by the overlapping ef-
fects of different CSD qualities. Thus, the application of our measurement schemes for CSD 
quality and CSP may add a new perspective to the ongoing discussion in this field of research. 
  
                                                 
12 This research question must be separated from an overwhelming number of investigations on the relationship 
between CSP and financial performance (for an overview, see Dixon-Fowler, Slater, Johnson, Ellstrand, and 
Romi, 2013; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes, 2003). 
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Appendix: Previous empirical studies on the relationship between CSD and CSP 
Author 
(year) 
n 
country CSD measurement CSP measurement 
Cho et al. 
(2012) 
 
92 
US 
 analysis of sustainability reports and annual reports  
 based on Clarkson et al. (2008) 
 environmental impact score by 
Newsweek/Trucost: includes air 
emissions, water use and waste 
Clarkson 
et al. (2011) 
51 
AU 
 analysis of sustainability reports and annual reports  
 based on Clarkson et al. (2008) 
 toxic releases per sale 
(90 risk-weighted substances) 
Dawkins & 
Fraas (2011) 
 
344 
US 
 reaction to a questionnaire by the Carbon Disclosure 
Project 
 three groups: complete answer, incomplete response/ 
provided alternative information, no response/refused to 
respond 
 rating by KLD: strengths and 
concerns 
 rating of carbon dioxide emissions 
de Villiers & 
van Staden 
(2011) 
120 
US 
 analysis of annual reports and corporate websites 
 number of sentences addressing the environment and not 
related to litigation 
 rating by KLD: strengths score 
minus concerns score 
Aerts & 
Cormier 
(2009) 
158 
CA/US 
 analysis of annual reports 
 39 items in six categories: expenditures/risks, compli-
ance, pollution abatement, sustainable development, re-
mediation/contamination, environmental management 
 weighting based on Wiseman (1982) 
 toxic releases per sale 
Clarkson 
et al. (2008) 
 
191 
US 
 analysis of sustainability reports  
 95 items in seven categories related to GRI guidelines 
(16 soft/easy to mimic, 79 hard/difficult to mimic) 
 0/1-classification 
 toxic waste recycling rate (rank) 
 toxic waste per sale (rank) 
Cho & Patten 
(2007) 
100 
US 
 analysis of annual reports  
 based on Patten (2002) 
 separate analysis of four monetary and four 
non-monetary elements 
 rating by KLD: “worse” or “better” 
performers depending on identified 
environmental concerns 
Cho et al. 
(2006) 
119 
US 
 analysis of annual reports 
 based on Patten (2002) 
 rating by KLD: total score 
environmental concerns 
de Villiers & 
van Staden 
(2006) 
 
≥137 
ZA 
 analysis of annual reports  
 based on Wiseman (1982)  
 general vs. specific disclosures 
 0/1-classification 
 separate analysis of eight general disclosure items 
regarding employees 
 not explicitly measured 
 relationship is assumed 
Al-Tuwaijri 
et al. (2004) 
 
198 
US 
 analysis of annual reports  
 four environmental indicators: toxic waste, financial 
penalties, cleanup responsibility for hazardous-waste 
sites, oil and chemical spills 
 weighting: quantitative (3), non-quantitative but related 
to indicators (2), general qualitative (1), no disclosure (0) 
 adjusted for firm-specific relevance 
 toxic waste recycling rate 
 toxic waste per sale 
 firm’s attitude toward environmental 
concerns (3 indicators) 
Patten (2002) 131 
US 
 analysis of annual reports  
 four monetary and four non-monetary elements 
 0/1-classification 
 additionally: line count 
  toxic releases per sale 
Hughes et al. 
(2001) 
 
51 
US 
 analysis of annual reports  
 based on Wiseman (1982) 
 five additional elements 
 weighting: quantitative (4), descriptive (3), vague (2), 
immaterial (1), no disclosure (0) 
 three groups (good, mixed, poor) 
based on ranking by Council on 
Economic Priorities: emissions to air 
and water, prevention programs 
Bewley & Li 
(2000) 
188 
CA 
 analysis of annual reports  
 based on Wiseman (1982) 
 additionally: financial vs. non-financial information 
 pollution propensity (high/low) 
depending on industry 
 toxic releases reported to federal 
database (yes/no) 
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Author 
(year) 
n 
country CSD measurement CSP measurement 
Fekrat et al. 
(1996) 
26 
US 
 analysis of annual reports  
 based on Wiseman (1982) 
 based on Ingram & Frazier (1980) 
Rockness 
(1985) 
26 
US 
 field experiment 
 participants’ perception of statements in annual reports 
 based on Ingram & Frazier (1980) 
Wiseman 
(1982) 
26 
US 
 analysis of annual reports  
 four categories containing eighteen items: economic, 
litigation, pollution, other information  
 weighting: quantitative (3), non-quantitative but 
related (2), general (1), no disclosure (0) 
 additionally: line count 
 based on Ingram & Frazier (1980) 
Ingram & 
Frazier 
(1980) 
 
40 
US 
 analysis of annual reports  
 four dimensions broken down into 20 categories: evi-
dence (e.g., monetary, non-monetary, qualitative), time 
(past, present, future), specificity (specific, general), 
theme (e.g., public interest, economic consequences) 
 check sentence by sentence 
 results per category and dimension (total score) 
 index by Council on Economic 
Priorities: emissions to air and 
water, prevention programs 
(AU) Australia, (CA) Canada, (US) United States, (ZA) South Africa, (n) sample size 
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The Nature of Managerial Capture in Sustainability Assurance Engagements1 
ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the nature of managerial capture in sustainability assurance engage-
ments in an empirical setting. We hypothesize that managerial capture, i.e., a client’s influ-
ence on the process and outcome of an assurance engagement, affects the assurance process 
and outcome in either a beneficial or a detrimental way with respect to transparency and ac-
countability toward external stakeholders. To assess the nature of managerial capture, we 
concentrate on the relationship between the intensity of the sustainability assurance services 
requested by the client and a firm’s corporate sustainability performance. Based on a sample 
of 122 European companies, our results reveal a negative relationship between assurance in-
tensity and firms’ sustainability performance, indicating the existence of a beneficial form of 
managerial capture. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past two decades, global awareness of the importance of sustainability has rapidly in-
creased. Stakeholders expect companies to act responsibly toward their natural and social en-
vironment and to demonstrate adherence to these expectations through corporate sustainabil-
ity disclosure. Reporting on extra-financial activities, such as corporate sustainability and cor-
porate social responsibility, “is now undeniably a mainstream global business practice” with 
93 percent of the largest 250 companies worldwide publishing stand-alone or integrated sus-
tainability reports in 2013 (KPMG, 2013, p. 22). Regarding the reasons for this development, 
previous research has shown that establishing legitimacy is a primary motive for a company’s 
corporate sustainability disclosure, which affects both the quantity and the quality of the in-
formation presented (Cho, Guidry, Hageman, & Patten, 2012; Cho & Patten, 2007). Stake-
holders are more likely to consider a company’s actions to be legitimate, i.e., in accordance 
with society’s expectations regarding sustainable business conduct (Suchman, 1995), if the 
information is disclosed in a convincing and credible way. 
Primarily as a means to enhance the credibility of their sustainability reporting, firms have 
begun to seek external assurance of their sustainability disclosure and to publish the resulting 
assurance statements (Edgley, Jones, & Solomon, 2010; Park & Brorson, 2005; Simnett, 
Vanstraelen, & Chua, 2009). Indeed, KPMG reports that the proportion of assured reports 
among the largest 250 companies worldwide increased from 29 percent in 2002 to 59 percent 
in 2013 (KPMG, 2013). In addition, firms seek external assurance to improve their internal 
management and reporting systems and actual sustainability performance (Park & Brorson, 
2005). The adoption of assurance, in conjunction with an assurance statement, can directly 
improve a firm’s perceived legitimacy and indirectly lead to internal and performance-related 
improvements. Therefore, a sustainability assurance engagement can serve as a legitimization 
                                                 
1 This paper is co-authored by Dr. Katrin Hummel, University of Zurich. 
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tool directed at stakeholders in addition to the sustainability disclosure itself (Darnall, Seol, & 
Sarkis, 2009; O’Dwyer, Owen, & Unerman, 2011). 
Because of the generally voluntary nature of assurance, client companies largely determine 
the overall intensity of assurance engagements. Ultimately, the client pays for the assurance 
services; thus, the client can freely select those services that best serve her interests. Accord-
ingly, concerns have been raised regarding whether assurance and assurance statements are 
merely another means of enhancing the public perception of a company’s sustainability im-
age, with detrimental effects on its accountability and transparency toward external stake-
holders. The literature uses the term managerial capture (MC) to describe this critical picture 
of management’s strategic influence on the process and outcome of assurance engagements 
(Ball, Owen, & Gray, 2000; Owen, Swift, Humphrey, & Bowerman, 2000). Previous empiri-
cal studies provide preliminary evidence for the existence of such a form of MC and generally 
derive their conclusions from the degree of stakeholder inclusivity in the assurance process 
and the quality of the assurance statement itself. For instance, O’Dwyer and Owen (2005, p. 
224) conclude that “[…] stakeholder engagement with the reporting organization per se is of-
ten minimal which suggests to us that accountability to stakeholders is a low priority in these 
exercises. Hence, […] there is still a large degree of management control over the reporting, 
and indeed assurance, process”. Ball et al. (2000) draw similar conclusions. However, limited 
stakeholder inclusivity during the assurance engagement may partly stem from “the confer-
ment of the assuror’s mandate” (Manetti & Toccafondi, 2012, p. 373). In addition, recent 
findings from qualitative research reveal that assurors exhibit a high level of commitment to 
accountability (O’Dwyer et al., 2011). Especially major accountancy firms, which currently 
dominate two-thirds of the sustainability assurance market (KPMG, 2013), are likely to de-
fend their commitment to accountability and to withstand the detrimental influence of their 
clients on the assurance process and its outcomes. 
In light of the ambiguous findings in the literature and the recent developments in the market 
for assurance engagements, we propose a broader and more neutral understanding of MC as a 
client’s influence on the process and outcomes of assurance engagements. We argue that the 
nature of MC can be beneficial or detrimental with respect to transparency and accountability 
toward external stakeholders. In the first case (beneficial MC), the client asks for more inten-
sive assurance services to improve her internal sustainability-related systems and procedures 
and thus enhance its corporate sustainability performance (CSP), accountability, and transpar-
ency. In the opposite case (detrimental MC), the assurance engagement degenerates into a 
window-dressing activity that lacks serious attempts to improve the true state of a company’s 
sustainability performance. In both scenarios, firms act under the assumption that an assur-
ance statement increases the credibility of their sustainability disclosure, although the effect is 
likely to be stronger in the beneficial scenario. We introduce a company’s CSP as a determin-
ing factor of the intensity of assurance services requested by the client in an assurance en-
gagement. By investigating the relationship between CSP and assurance intensity (AI), we 
provide insights into the nature of MC. If the client captures the assurance services in a det-
rimental way, we expect to find a positive relationship between CSP and AI. This detrimental 
form of MC reflects a critical perspective on sustainability assurance because poor sustaina-
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bility performers would obtain less intensive assurance to protect their external image without 
actually attempting to enhance their true state. Conversely, if a beneficial form of MC exists, 
we expect to find a negative relationship between CSP and AI. In this case, poor-performing 
companies seek more intensive assurance to improve their credibility, sustainability-related 
processes, and CSP. 
Our investigation of the relationship between CSP and AI extends the literature in several 
ways. First, we introduce a broad understanding of MC and provide an example of the exist-
ence of a beneficial form of MC that advances recent qualitative evidence on the process in-
volved in sustainability assurance engagements. Client firms indeed affect the intensity of as-
surance services; however, this influence can be beneficial for transparency and accountabil-
ity depending on the firms’ CSP. Second, to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first 
to investigate the nature of MC in an empirical setting. In so doing, we respond to the call 
from previous researchers for an empirical investigation of the “diffusion of assurance ser-
vices in relation to a firm’s social and environmental performance” (Kolk & Perego, 2010, p. 
195). Moreover, we extend existing knowledge on the determinants of assurance adoption in 
general (Cho, Michelon, Patten, & Roberts, 2014; Kolk & Perego, 2010; Simnett et al., 2009) 
by providing insights into the determinants of AI for firms that adopt sustainability assurance. 
Our empirical results reveal a substantial impact of both firms’ financial performance and 
firms’ overall assurance and audit fees on AI. Third, our empirical model includes proxies for 
a provider’s independence and competence, which allows us to support findings from the au-
dit literature. Both determinants appear to be relevant not only for mandatory financial audits 
but also for voluntary sustainability assurance engagements. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, the related literature is reviewed, 
and hypotheses are developed. The subsequent section outlines our research design. In partic-
ular, the data sample and empirical model are presented and our main variables of interest, 
namely AI and CSP, are introduced. Then, descriptive statistics, findings from our main anal-
yses, and robustness checks follow. Finally, we report our conclusions. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Prior evidence on managerial capture and theoretical background 
Ongoing research on sustainability assurance includes three primary areas of interest.2 Studies 
on the adoption of assurance predominantly focus on firm-, industry-, and country-specific 
determinants. Using an international sample of 2,113 companies, Simnett et al. (2009) report 
that companies in stakeholder-orientated countries (operationalized as code law countries) and 
companies with a greater need to enhance credibility (operationalized as affiliation to certain 
industries) are more likely to seek assurance for their sustainability reports. They also find 
that firm size positively influences the voluntary adoption of assurance. Similar results are 
obtained by Kolk and Perego (2010) and Cho et al. (2014), who report a significant impact of 
                                                 
2 Moreover, experimental studies have examined report users’ perceptions of the reliability of sustainability 
disclosure and assurance (Hodge, Subramaniam, & Stewart, 2009; Pflugrath, Roebuck, & Simnett, 2011). 
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country-level institutional factors in addition to industry affiliation on assurance adoption. 
Further, Darnall et al. (2009) show the role of internal and external stakeholders in the selec-
tion of various types of environmental audits. While these studies agree that enhanced credi-
bility is a major reason for a company’s voluntary adoption of assurance, Kolk and Perego 
(2010, p. 195) conclude that “future research should examine the quality of sustainability as-
surance statements rather than merely their adoption”. 
A second group of studies investigates the outcomes of sustainability assurance engagements 
in detail, i.e., assurance statement quality. The existence of MC is often highlighted, and re-
searchers favor descriptive approaches based on content analysis to derive a critical picture of 
assurance engagements. Accordingly, Owen et al. (2000, p. 85) define MC as a “concept that 
sees management take control of the whole process […] by strategically collecting and dis-
seminating only the information it deems appropriate to advance the corporate image, rather 
than being truly transparent and accountable to the society it serves”.3 Ball et al. (2000) ana-
lyze assurance statements from 53 European companies and ascertain a detrimental form of 
MC based on examinations of statement addressees, auditor independence, and the rigor of 
verification work. In another content analysis of 41 European statements, O’Dwyer and Owen 
(2005) similarly interpret the lack of transparency, accountability, and stakeholder inclusivity 
as evidence of the existence of a detrimental form of MC. Conclusions derived by Deegan, 
Cooper, and Shelly (2006) and Cooper and Owen (2007) complement these findings. Howev-
er, Manetti and Toccafondi (2012, p. 373) note that there is “ample room for a variety of in-
terpretations” and that MC should “be interpreted in the light of procedures for conferment of 
the assurors’ mandate”. 
Valuable insights can therefore be gained at the third and most detailed level of investigation, 
at which the process of assurance engagements is examined. Studies in this area predominant-
ly use qualitative methods such as interviews and case studies, and they find that sustainabil-
ity assurance is an iterative process with close interactions between the client and its assur-
ance provider (O’Dwyer, 2011; O’Dwyer et al., 2011; Park & Brorson, 2005). Although 
Edgley et al. (2010, p. 553) interpret the lack of stakeholder inclusivity as evidence of the ex-
istence of a detrimental form of MC, they conclude that “there is significant change underway 
in the area” and that “indirect stakeholder involvement […] now represents good practice”. 
This momentum is reflected in works by O’Dwyer (2011) and O’Dwyer et al. (2011), who 
reveal that assurance providers exhibit high commitment to accountability to external stake-
holders. In particular, these authors emphasize the independence and power of providers in 
the assurance process. Some of these studies also examine companies’ motives for sustaina-
bility assurance (Edgley et al., 2010; Park & Brorson, 2005; Simnett et al., 2009), identifying 
enhanced credibility, refined internal systems or processes, and improved CSP as primary rea-
sons for adopting assurance. By contrast, companies may avoid adopting assurance because of 
the additional costs, the lack of perceived value added, and a lack of stakeholder demand 
(Park & Brorson, 2005). 
                                                 
3 (Power, 1991, 1996, 1997) also raises such concerns, noting the importance of substance in environmental 
assurance. 
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From a theoretical perspective, legitimacy theory (LT) and stakeholder theory (ST) contribute 
to the understanding of previous findings on the adoption, outcome, and process of sustaina-
bility assurance engagements (Darnall et al., 2009; O’Dwyer et al., 2011).4 Legitimacy is de-
fined as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). “If central stakeholders lose confidence in the firm’s 
performance, legitimacy may be withdrawn as the stakeholders refuse to provide their share 
of reciprocal benefits” and “if the firm cannot compensate for lost stakeholder benefits, it be-
comes ‘illegitimate’ and dies” (Wood, 1991, p. 697).5 Accordingly, firms that are perceived as 
non-sustainable by their stakeholders run the risks of harming their image, decreasing cus-
tomer satisfaction, hampering their attraction to eligible employees, and facing litigation and 
regulatory constraints (Ameer & Othman, 2012; Ihlen & Roper, 2014; Kollman & Prakash, 
2001; Wood, 1991). Firms may use a variety of strategies to cope with threatened legitimacy, 
such as shaping public perceptions through disclosure and altering business performance itself 
(Deegan, 2002; O’Donovan, 2002; Sethi, 1978). Sustainability assurance engagements can be 
regarded as legitimization tools that are in line with such strategies. The process of assurance 
helps firms to improve their internal systems, procedures, and, ultimately, CSP, which refers 
to the strategy of altering business performance. The signaling effect of assurance adoption in 
conjunction with assurance statements shape public perceptions by increasing a firm’s credi-
bility and demonstrating the seriousness of its sustainability-related endeavors. In so doing, 
sustainability assurance engagements serve a firm’s self-interest of being perceived as legiti-
mate and may simultaneously provide additional transparency and accountability to external 
stakeholders. 
Overall, while our brief overview of the literature reveals that studies generally agree on the 
existence of MC and theoretical considerations provide a meaningful framework for MC, the 
determinants and thus the nature of MC remain unclear. Qualitative research has recently sof-
tened the initially critical picture of MC, revealing that negotiations regarding the terms of an 
assurance engagement and close interactions between the client and the assurance provider in 
the assurance process are common practice. Accordingly, we introduce a more general defini-
tion of MC as a client’s influence on the process and outcome of assurance engagements. 
Drawing on this broader and more neutral definition, we argue that MC can be beneficial or 
detrimental with respect to accountability and transparency toward external stakeholders. 
Detrimental and beneficial managerial capture hypotheses 
While previous studies primarily focus on the quality of assurance statements as an indicator 
of the existence of MC, we concentrate on the relationship between CSP and AI to assess 
whether a beneficial or detrimental form of MC exists. Because CSP improvements are a pri-
mary reason that firms adopt sustainability assurance, investigating the relationship between 
                                                 
4 LT refers to general societies in which companies exist, whereas ST refers to specific stakeholders within 
these societies “that can affect, or are affected by, the accomplishment of organizational purpose” (Freeman, 
1984, p. 25). 
5 Similar conclusions are also drawn by Davis (1973). 
85 
 
CSP and AI allows us to directly observe the nature of MC. We argue that a positive relation-
ship between CSP and AI indicates a detrimental form of MC. Previous studies identify en-
hanced credibility as another major reason that firms seek external assurance (Edgley et al., 
2010; Park & Brorson, 2005; Simnett et al., 2009). Because firms with poor CSP are particu-
larly subject to legitimacy threats and because they experience greater difficulty in convincing 
their stakeholders of their sustainability, these companies may seek highly intensive assurance 
services to enhance their external credibility. However, if these poor-performing firms are not 
seriously interested in improving their poor internal systems, processes, and CSP, they will 
seek low-intensity assurance services. In this case, sustainability assurance merely serves as a 
window-dressing activity or merely reflects compliance with the common industry practice of 
adopting at least some type of assurance. The assurance engagement is regarded as a compul-
sory exercise that per se provides some credibility irrespective of its intensity. In this case, 
poor sustainability performers conceal the status of their internal systems and processes from 
their stakeholders by requesting lower intensity assurance services. Content-based analyses 
support this critical picture of assurance, indicating that management’s control over the assur-
ance process hampers the firm’s accountability and transparency toward external stakeholders 
(Ball et al., 2000; Cooper & Owen, 2007; Deegan et al., 2006; O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005). In 
line with this argumentation, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Detrimental MC hypothesis: A positive relationship exists between corporate sustainability 
 performance (CSP) and assurance intensity (AI). 
However, if firms with poor CSP are interested in improving their internal systems, processes, 
and CSP, they can utilize intensive assurance services to support these goals with the further 
benefit of enhancing their credibility. Poor-performing companies seek more intensive assur-
ance services that can also be delivered in an iterative and partly advisory way. In this case, a 
beneficial form of MC arises, which is reflected by a negative relationship between CSP and 
AI. This reasoning is also supported by recent developments in the assurance market, where 
major accountancy firms constituted two-thirds of the market in 2013 (KPMG, 2013). The 
increasing market shares of the major accountancy firms are accompanied by an increase in 
supply-side market power, which weakens clients’ influence in the assurance engagement. 
Although assurance seekers – as purchasers of assurance services – still largely determine the 
intensity of engagements, the potential to capture the assurance process in a detrimental way 
is diminishing. Accordingly, recent qualitative research portrays assurance providers, particu-
larly major accountancy firms, as independent, dedicated to the principle of stakeholder ac-
countability, and highly risk averse with respect to the text of assurance statements (O’Dwyer, 
2011; O’Dwyer et al., 2011). Against this background, we propose the following alternative 
hypothesis: 
Beneficial MC hypothesis: A negative relationship exists between corporate sustainability 
 performance (CSP) and assurance intensity (AI). 
Our hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, some firms may capture the assurance 
process in a detrimental way, whereas other firms may capture it in a beneficial way. In addi-
tion, firms may also opt for a mixed form of MC, as the motives for obtaining assurance ser-
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vices and thus the two effects partially overlap and cancel one another out. Whether, on aver-
age, MC is beneficial or detrimental with respect to transparency and accountability toward 
external stakeholders remains an empirical question. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Assurance statement elements 
While legally binding regulations on sustainability assurance are rare, assurance standards, 
namely, the International Standard on Assurance Engagements 3000 (ISAE 3000) and the Ac-
countAbility 1000 Assurance Standard (AA1000AS), exist. Additionally, the Global Report-
ing Initiative (GRI) publishes recommendations on the process and outcome of sustainability 
assurance engagements. ISAE 3000 is provided by the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB), which is affiliated to the International Federation of Accountants 
(IFAC). The primary aim of ISAE 3000 is to “establish basic principles and essential proce-
dures for […] professional accountants […] for the performance of assurance engagements 
other than audits or reviews of historical financial information” (IFAC, 2008, p. 4).6 The use 
of this standard is mandatory for assurance providers that are members of the IFAC, especial-
ly major accountancy firms, although the standard is not specifically designed for sustainabil-
ity assurance engagements. Specific guidance on the assurance of sustainability-related dis-
closure is provided by the AA1000AS, which was developed by the international non-profit 
organization AccountAbility through a multi-stakeholder process. In addition to these stand-
ards, the GRI – originally known for its widely used guidelines on sustainability reporting – 
has begun to publish recommendations on the selection of an appropriate assurance provider 
and on good practice regarding the assurance process and statement elements. 
Previous research on assurance statement quality typically draws on a combined list of assur-
ance statement elements that are recommended by assurance standards (O’Dwyer & Owen, 
2005; Perego & Kolk, 2012). This list serves as a benchmark to evaluate assurance statements 
through content analysis. Similarly, based on requirements and recommendations of ISAE 
3000, AA1000AS, and GRI, we identify a benchmark list of assurance statement elements 
that guides the assessment of our main variable, AI, and assurance-related control variables in 
our model. Table 1 presents an overview of these statement elements by responsible party on 
the vertical axis and by research design on the horizontal axis.7  
                                                 
6 ISAE 3000 was recently revised. The new version will be effective for engagements that date the assurance 
statement on or after December 15, 2015. 
7 The statement elements are described in greater detail in the subsequent sections of the paper. 
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Table 1. Overview of assurance statement elements 
 
Assurance intensity Control variables Complementary elements 
Client 
 balancea 
 level 
 scope 
 coverage 
 recommendationsa 
 addressees  responsibilities 
Provider 
  competenceb 
 independencec 
 assuror 
 procedures 
 opinion 
 limitations 
 miscellaneousd 
a Item only mandatory/recommended according to AA1000AS/GRI. 
b Item only mandatory according to AA1000AS. 
c Item only mandatory according to AA1000AS/ISAE 3000. 
d Item includes representative, date, place, and standard. 
In our research design, we distinguish among elements that describe the intensity of the assur-
ance engagement, elements that refer to a statement’s overall stakeholder orientation and to 
provider characteristics, and complementary elements. The first group constitutes elements 
that are used to construct our main variable of interest, namely, AI, and elements in the second 
group serve as control variables in our model. The elements in the third group complete a 
statement and either depend on elements in the aforementioned groups or refer to unrelated 
basic disclosures. All elements across the three groups are relevant for assessing the com-
pleteness of an individual assurance statement. The distinction between client and provider on 
the vertical axis indicates the party that is predominantly responsible for the definition of the 
assurance characteristics that ultimately translate into the respective statement elements. Alt-
hough assurance statements are generally written by the assurance provider, the terms of the 
assurance engagement are negotiated between both parties prior to the engagement. The cli-
ent, for instance, bears the costs of the assurance services and thus primarily determines the 
intensity-related elements that we use to proxy for AI. The assuror, however, “shall be satis-
fied that the engagement subject matter is appropriate” (AccountAbility, 2008, p. 13; similarly 
IFAC, 2008, p. 6). Ultimately, the assurance provider selects the appropriate assurance proce-
dures and states his opinion. 
Sample, data collection, and empirical model 
Our initial sample consists of 195 companies located in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, or the United Kingdom. To be included, a company must be listed in the 
Bloomberg European 500 index in January 2013, provide sufficient information on its CSP 
for the reporting year 2011, and belong to an industry group that contains at least five compa-
nies in total. Of these 195 companies, 68 percent seek external assurance. Further, of these 
133 companies, eleven are excluded because the corresponding assurance statements could 
not be retrieved from corporate websites, a web search engine, or by direct request. Our final 
sample includes 122 European companies across 18 industry groups. The sample composition 
is depicted in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Sample composition by country8 and by industry 
By country n  By industry n 
1 France 26 1 chemicals 6 
2 Germany 18 2  building materials, paper, steel 10 
3 Italy 12 3 mining 8 
4 Spain 19 4 advertising, entertainment, media 4 
5 Sweden 5 5 telecommunication 9 
6 Switzerland 11 6 computers and software 3 
7 United Kingdom 31 7 car manufacturers 4 
  8  retail 4 
  9 food and beverages 5 
  10 pharmaceuticals 6 
  11  oil and gas 8 
  12 banking and financial services 18 
  13 insurance 4 
  14 REITS 4 
  15  aerospace and defense 5 
  16  engineering and construction 9 
  17  electricity 7 
  18  gas, water, and electricity distribution 8 
Total 122 Total 122 
For each company, one of the authors manually recorded the information in the assurance 
statements between May and August 2014. All uncertainties were discussed between the au-
thors and were resolved through consensus. 
We use the following econometric model to test our hypotheses regarding whether companies 
on average capture sustainability assurance engagements in a beneficial or detrimental way: 
Equation (1): AI = β0 + β1 csp + β2 addressee + β3 independence + β4 competence 
 + ∑ βii=8i=5  assuror + β9 fees + β10 size + β11 fin_perf + β12 leverage 
 + ∑ βjj=29j=13  industry + ∑ βkk=35k=30  country + . 
Assurance intensity 
Our dependent variable AI captures the intensity of the assurance services requested by the 
client in a sustainability assurance engagement. AI is an index variable that covers five aspects 
of AI and that comprises the statement elements balance, level, scope, coverage, and recom-
mendations. Each of these elements is measured as described below. Then, if necessary, the 
elements are proportionally rescaled on a [0, 1] interval and summed to the index variable AI. 
                                                 
8 No mandatory assurance requirements are in place in the countries considered for the reporting year 2011. In 
France, Grenelle II requires third-party assurance for companies exceeding certain size thresholds, but the 
stepwise phase-in process only began in 2012. Swedish companies are only obliged to seek external assurance 
if they are state owned. The 2011 Spanish Sustainable Economy Law requires companies to state whether 
their sustainability report has been assured, but there is no general obligation to seek external assurance. 
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All statement elements are mandatory, recommended, or allowed according to ISAE 3000, 
AA1000AS, and GRI, which ensures their measurability irrespective of the applied standard. 
The first index element balance refers to an assurance engagement in which the assuror is re-
quested to assess whether the sustainability report provides a balanced representation of the 
company’s overall sustainability performance, i.e., “the report should reflect positive and neg-
ative aspects of the organization’s performance to enable a reasoned assessment of overall 
performance” (GRI, 2013a, p. 17). Such a report avoids inflating a company’s perceived sus-
tainability performance by selective or overly positive disclosure. This aim is also reflected in 
the foundation principles of stakeholder inclusivity, materiality, and responsiveness within the 
AA1000AS. Balance is measured on a binary scale indicating whether the overall balance of 
the report and adequate stakeholder inclusion is assessed (equals “1”) or not (equals “0”). 
The second AI index element level corresponds to the assurance engagement risk of having 
not detected any circumstances that may call into question the assuror’s opinion on the objects 
being examined. According to AA1000AS, “the assurance provider achieves high assurance 
where sufficient evidence has been obtained to support their statement such that the risk of 
their conclusion being in error is very low but not zero”. Similarly, “the assurance provider 
achieves moderate assurance where sufficient evidence has been obtained to support their 
statement such that the risk of their conclusion being in error is reduced but not reduced to 
very low but not zero” (AccountAbility, 2008, p. 11). Instead of “high” and “moderate”, the 
ISAE 3000 proposes the terms “reasonable” and “limited”. A reasonable/high assurance level 
is required for a positive assurance opinion, whereas a limited/low assurance level only allows 
for a negative opinion. A higher level of assurance is more costly because additional and more 
intensive assurance procedures are required to sufficiently reduce assurance engagement risk. 
Level is therefore measured on an ordinal scale, where “1” refers to a moderate assurance lev-
el, “2” to a mixed assurance level that depends on the different objects being assured, and “3” 
refers to a high assurance level. If the engagement is simply a review and thus if no assurance 
level is provided, the statement is coded “0”. 
Next, the index element scope refers to the question of which disclosures are covered by the 
assurance engagement. While the ISAE 3000 standard merely refers to the “subject matter”, 
the AA1000AS standard distinguishes between “type 1” and “type 2” assurance depending on 
the scope of the engagement. According to the GRI, assurance engagements may include 
“policies outlined and data published” as well as “processes and systems related to sustaina-
bility” (GRI, 2013b, p. 11). Our index variable scope indicates whether the assurance covers 
numerical values or qualitative statements (equals “1”), numerical values and qualitative 
statements (equals “2”), or the full report (equals “3”). 
Similar to scope, the fourth AI index element coverage captures the number of core sustaina-
bility performance indicators that are covered by the assurance. Drawing on our measurement 
scheme for csp outlined in the next section, we measure coverage as the proportion of the 
number of assured core sustainability performance indicators relative to the number of report-
ed core indicators. The measure thus ranges in the interval [0, 1]. A higher proportion is asso-
ciated with more intensive assurance work. 
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Recommendations is the fifth and final AI index element, which is mandatory according to 
AA1000AS and voluntary according to ISAE 3000. This part of an assurance statement typi-
cally provides improvements to a company’s sustainability reporting, systems, and processes. 
The preparation of recommendations by the assuror requires additional work, which bears 
higher cost and indicates a more intensive assurance engagement. Accordingly, the variable is 
coded “1” if recommendations are included and “0” otherwise. Table 3 summarizes the five 
elements that constitute our index variable AI. 
Table 3. Overview of elements contained in independent index variable AI 
AI element Coding Example / Computation 
balance (1) yes 
 
 
(0) no 
“the […] principles of [stakeholder] inclusivity, materiality and 
responsiveness have been used as criteria against which to evaluate 
the Report” (Barclays) 
“our engagement is limited to […] the ‘cement’ business line […] 
we did not perform any assurance procedures on other information 
presented” (HeidelbergCement) 
level (3) high/reasonable 
(2) mixed 
 
(1) moderate/limited 
(0) none 
“to provide high level of assurance” (CaixaBank) 
“moderate assurance” along with “the indicators identified by the 
symbol […] reasonable assurance” (GDF Suez) 
“we have carried out a limited assurance engagement” (Snam) 
no level is assigned, common terms are “review” (Holmen), 
“certification”, and “verification” (both Credit Suisse) 
scope (3) full report 
(2) numerical and 
 qualitative 
(1) numerical or  
 qualitative 
“assurance engagement on all parts of the […] report” (Bayer) 
“assurance engagement on environmental performance information 
[…], including the explanatory notes” (Allianz) 
“perform […] procedures […] on the following environmental, 
safety, social […] performance indicators” (Tullow Oil) 
coverage [0, 1] interval assured sustainability performance indicators included in measure-
ment scheme for csp / reported sustainability performance indica-
tors included in measurement scheme for csp 
recommendations (1) yes 
 
(0) no 
“we make the following recommendations for the further develop-
ment” (Deutsche Telekom) 
no recommendations are presented 
Table 3 presents the elements that are used to proxy for AI along with examples from sustainability assurance 
statements and the corresponding coding categories. 
Corporate sustainability performance and control variables 
Our first independent and main variable of interest with respect to our research question is 
csp. We follow the approach developed by Hummel and Schlick (2014) to measuring CSP on 
the environmental and social dimensions of sustainability. Based on the GRI reporting guide-
lines, these authors derive eight essential performance indicators that can be applied to firms 
in different industry groups. The scheme comprises four environmental and four social per-
formance indicators that are evaluated based on hand-recorded data. After the raw indicator 
data are winsorized at a 10 percent level and proportionally [0, 1] normalized on an industry 
group basis, the indicators are aggregated into the total sustainability performance score by 
calculating their mean. Thus, csp is a continuous variable that ranges in the interval between 
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zero (worst-in-industry-group performance for all indicators) and one (best-in-industry-group 
performance for all indicators). An overview of the measurement approach is provided in Ta-
ble 4. 
Table 4. Indicators included in the measurement scheme for csp (Hummel & Schlick, 2014) 
Performance indicator Measurement Unit 
Environmental dimension 
energy consumption (direct + indirect energy consumption) 
/ number of employeesa 
MWh / employee 
water withdrawal (total water withdrawal – cooling water) 
/ number of employeesa 
m3 / employee 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHG protocol scope 1 + scope 2 emissions) 
/ number of employeesa 
t / employee 
total weight of waste total weight of waste 
/ number of employeesa 
t / employee 
Social dimension 
employee turnover total number of employeesa who leave 
/ number of employeesa * 100 
percent 
lost time incident rate number of incidents resulting in lost time 
from work / (total hours worked / 200,000) 
incidents / h 
employee training total training time 
/ number of employeesa 
h / employee 
share of women in the highest 
corporate bodiesb 
total number of women in the highest corporate bodiesb 
/ total number of members of the highest corporate 
bodiesb * 100 
percent 
a If available, full-time equivalents; headcount otherwise. 
b Management board and supervisory board for two-tier system countries; board of directors for one-tier system 
countries. 
This approach to measuring csp is especially useful for our research setting because sustaina-
bility reports typically refer to both environmental and social dimensions. Firms seek to pro-
tect their perceived legitimacy on both dimensions by increasing their sustainability report’s 
credibility through external assurance. Thus, the applied measurement scheme directly ad-
dresses the two dimensions and comprehensively covers sustainability performance within 
them. We expect to obtain a positive sign for csp if the detrimental form of MC prevails and a 
negative sign if the beneficial form dominates on average.  
In addition to csp, we rely on the literature on sustainability assurance to select the control 
variables that are included in our model. First, we control for addressee, which is a binary 
variable indicating whether the assurance statement is explicitly addressed to a broad audi-
ence, such as all stakeholders (equals “1”), or not (equals “0”). Previous studies often regard a 
low degree of stakeholder inclusivity as an indicator of a detrimental form of MC (Cooper & 
Owen, 2007; Deegan et al., 2006; O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005). Addressee proxies for the in-
tended audience of the assurance statement, which can affect accountability and transparency 
toward external stakeholders. We therefore expect addressee to have a positive effect on AI. 
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Next, we control for two provider characteristics, namely, independence and competence, 
which are essential requirements according to ISAE 3000, AA1000AS, and GRI. Findings 
from the financial audit literature suggest that limited auditor independence corresponds to 
lower audit quality, particularly a lack of objectivity in the audit engagement and obliging au-
dit assessments (Blay & Geiger, 2013; DeAngelo, 1981). This finding is qualified by studies 
that report no relationship or even a negative relationship depending on market conditions and 
audit firm rotation (Daniels & Booker, 2011; Jamal & Sunder, 2011). Common proxies for 
auditor independence in the financial audit literature are often derived from audit fees (Blay & 
Geiger, 2013; Markelevich & Rosner, 2013). However, a similar approach is not feasible with 
respect to the measurement of assuror independence because companies do not separately dis-
close their expenses for sustainability assurance services. We therefore rely on four conditions 
that might indicate constraints on assuror independence.9 Our index variable independence 
indicates potentially threatened provider independence if at least one of these constraints is 
present (equals “0”) or none is present (equals “1”). An independent assurance provider can 
more easily stipulate assurance services of higher intensity for the self-serving purpose of in-
creasing revenues. Consequently, we expect to find a positive effect of independence on our 
dependent variable AI. 
The variable competence refers to both the familiarity of the assurance provider with a specif-
ic company and the provider’s general proficiency. Competence is an index variable that is 
calculated as the sum of a variable indicating whether the assurance provider has also assured 
the previous sustainability report (equals “1”) or not (equals “0”) and a variable indicating the 
completeness of the assurance statement. Completeness is measured as the proportion of in-
formation elements that are contained in the assurance statements relative to our benchmark 
list of all statement elements (as indicated in Table 1). The combined proxy for competence 
ranges in the interval between zero and two. We expect to find a positive relationship between 
competence and AI because a highly competent assurance provider has the necessary skills 
and experience to provide not only superficial but also intensive assurance services. In addi-
tion, such an assuror is more likely to have client-specific knowledge that helps her to stipu-
late more intensive assurance services during pre-engagement negotiations (O’Dwyer, 2011; 
O’Dwyer et al., 2011). 
Previous research shows that both the assurance services and their descriptions in assurance 
statements differ depending on the type of assurance provider, particularly accountant as-
surors versus consultant assurors (Mock, Strohm, & Swartz, 2007; O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005). 
Assuror refers to four dummy variables indicating each of the Big 4 accounting firms and a 
pool of other assurors, such as small accounting firms, consultancy firms, or certification bod-
ies.10  
                                                 
9 These conditions include additional sustainability-related consulting or assurance services, congruence be-
tween assuror and financial statement auditor, the characterization of the engagement as an iterative process, 
and a negative or missing declaration of independence (AccountAbility, 2008; IFAC, 2013). 
10 This dummy structure also allows us to account for certain firms having more than one assurance provider at a 
given time. 
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In addition to the variables derived from the assurance statement, we control for a selection of 
firm-specific variables. Voluntary sustainability assurance engagements entail additional costs 
that depend on the intensity of the services requested. Clients are engaged in cost-benefit con-
siderations, and providers may have to justify additional services based on these considera-
tions (Kolk & Perego, 2010; Mock et al., 2007; O’Dwyer, 2011; Park & Brorson, 2005; 
Simnett et al., 2009). Because separate data on sustainability assurance fees are not available, 
we draw on the total amount of a firm’s expenditures on audit, audit-related, and other ser-
vices. Our variable fees refers to such expenditures divided by the number of employees and 
normalized on an industry group basis. We have no expectation regarding the sign, as higher 
total fees may either ease the justification for the relatively minor additional fees of more in-
tensive sustainability assurance services or hamper the adoption of more intensive services, 
potentially because the overall fees are already high. 
We draw on previous empirical studies and further control for a company’s size, financial per-
formance, leverage, industry group, and country of domicile (Cho et al., 2014; Kolk & 
Perego, 2010; Ruhnke & Gabriel, 2013; Simnett et al., 2009). Our variable size is measured as 
the decimal logarithm of the number of employees at the end of the fiscal year. Large firms 
may have greater negotiating power than smaller clients and may face additional legitimacy 
pressure because of their outstanding public visibility (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Dawkins 
& Fraas, 2011). However, we have no expectation regarding the sign, as the total effect is un-
clear and our sample primarily comprises large firms. The financial performance proxy 
fin_perf is measured as the free cash flow in millions of euros per employee at the 2011 fiscal 
year end. We expect a positive sign, as financially more sound companies may have greater 
capacity to request intensive assurance services and as providers may face less resistance 
when suggesting additional services. Leverage, which refers to the informational needs of a 
company’s creditors, is measured as the average total assets divided by average total common 
equity. Because creditors of a highly leveraged firm may demand higher security regarding 
sustainability-related risks to assess the long-term success of a company, leverage may have a 
positive effect on our dependent variable AI. However, high leverage may also indicate finan-
cial difficulties or a shareholder structure dominated by myopic investors who demand cost 
cutting. Accordingly, we have no expectation regarding the sign for leverage. The series of 
dummy variables denoted by country is included to account for regulatory, cultural, and socie-
tal differences depending on companies’ country of domicile. Especially under the detri-
mental MC hypothesis, firms regard sustainability assurance as an inconvenient compulsory 
exercise, for instance, to comply with common industry practice. Practices as well as account-
ability and transparency toward external stakeholders vary across industries. We account for 
this variability by also including industry group dummies. Table 5 provides an overview of all 
the model variables along with descriptions and data sources. 
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Table 5. Variables overview 
Variable Description Source of data 
AI intensity of the assurance services, measured as an index variable as 
described in Table 3 and in the “Assurance intensity” section 
assurance statement, 
sustainability disclosure 
csp CSP of the client, measured as described in Table 4 and in the “Cor-
porate sustainability performance and control variables” section 
sustainability disclosure 
addressee addressee of the assurance statement, measured as a binary variable 
indicating all stakeholders (1) or not (0) 
assurance statement 
independence independence of the assuror, measured as a binary index variable 
indicating potentially threatened independence (0) or not (1) 
assurance statement, 
annual report 
competence competence of the assuror, measured as an index variable ranging 
from zero to two and referring to the familiarity with a client and 
general proficiency 
assurance statement 
assuror assuror dummy variables referring to Deloitte, Ernst & Young, 
KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, others, and the reference category 
is PricewaterhouseCoopers 
assurance statement 
fees total expenditures of the client on audit, audit-related, and other 
services divided by the number of employees and normalized on an 
industry group basis 
annual report 
size firm size of the client, measured as the log of total employees at the 
end of the fiscal year 
annual report, 
sustainability disclosure 
fin_perf financial performance of the client, measured as the free cash flow 
(cash flow from operating activities − total capital expenditures) in 
millions of euros per employee at the end of the fiscal year  
Bloomberg database 
leverage financial leverage of the client (average total assets / average total 
common equity) during the fiscal year 
Bloomberg database 
industry industry group dummy variables as reported in Table 2, and the ref-
erence category is banking and financial services 
Bloomberg database, 
annual report 
country country of domicile dummy variables as reported in Table 2, and the 
reference category is the UK 
Bloomberg database 
RESULTS 
Descriptive analyses 
Panel A of Table 6 presents descriptive statistics on the five AI index variables balance, level, 
scope, coverage, and recommendations. The results for balance reveal that 37 percent of our 
sample firms not only seek veracity assurance but also mandate their assurance providers to 
perform more intensive work, i.e., to assess the overall balance of the contents and stakehold-
er considerations within their sustainability reports. Of our firms, 69 percent request a moder-
ate level of assurance, 17 percent rely on mixed levels, and only 3 percent seek a high assur-
ance level. The remaining 11 percent of assurance statements do not provide an assurance 
level, indicating a superficial assurance engagement of low intensity. This trend of most firms 
seeking a rather low level of AI also applies to the scope of assurance engagements. In 93 
percent of all cases, the engagement is restricted to selected numerical and/or qualitative 
statements, whereas only 7 percent of the sample firms seek assurance of the full report. A 
more positive picture is revealed by the results for coverage and recommendations. Of the 
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core sustainability indicators covered by our measurement scheme for csp, on average, 80 
percent are verified by an external assuror. Of the sample firms, 55 percent also request their 
assurors to provide recommendations on future improvements. One assurance statement ex-
plicitly contains all recommendations prepared by the assuror, whereas some inform the read-
er that additional recommendations were revealed only to the client. Overall, the constituents 
of AI present a mixed picture of the intensity of the assurance services requested by our sam-
ple firms. 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics for model variables 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics AI elements (original values before rescaling) 
 0 1 2 3 mean sd 
(1.1) balance 63% 37% . . 0.37 0.48 
(1.2) level 11% 69% 17% 3% 1.13 0.63 
(1.3) scope . 31% 61% 7% 1.76 0.58 
(1.4) coverage . . . . 0.80 0.26 
(1.5) recommendations 45% 55% . . 0.55 0.50 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics regression variables 
  n min max mean sd 
(1) AI  122 0.83 5.00 2.68 0.99 
(2) csp  122 0.06 0.93 0.55 0.18 
(3) addressee  122 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.34 
(4) independence  122 0.00 1.00 0.26 0.44 
(5) competence  122 0.70 2.00 1.68 0.40 
(6) fees  122 0.00 1.00 0.39 0.36 
(7) size  122 1.93 5.46 4.56 0.68 
(8) fin_perf  122 −1.97 1.17 0.02 0.31 
(9) leverage  122 −72.03 62.48 6.04 10.98 
Panel A in Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for the variables included in our index variable AI. The catego-
ries “0” to “3” refer to balance and recommendations being binary variables, level and scope being ordinal vari-
ables, and coverage being a continuous variable. Panel B shows AI on an aggregated level along with the other 
variables included in our regression analysis. 
The previous mixed findings directly translate into a mean of 2.68 and standard deviation of 
0.99 for our dependent variable AI, which is presented in Panel B of Table 6 along with de-
scriptive statistics for our regression variables. Because some firms in our sample obtain the 
maximum value of 5.00, sustainability assurance does not appear to be a window-dressing 
activity in general. Our variable csp ranges between a minimum value of 0.06 and a maximum 
value of 0.93, with a mean of 0.55. These results are similar to those of Hummel and Schlick 
(2014) and do not indicate selection bias in our sample with respect to csp. Descriptive statis-
tics on addressee reveal that the assurance statements are rarely addressed to external stake-
holders, which is in line with previous studies (Cooper & Owen, 2007; Deegan et al., 2006; 
Manetti & Toccafondi, 2012; O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005). Regarding provider-specific determi-
nants of AI, independence is rather low with a mean of 0.26. Low levels of provider inde-
pendence reflect the nature of sustainability assurance engagements, i.e., providers are often 
engaged in additional consulting or auditing services and iterative interaction with their cli-
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ents. Our broad measurement approach for independence is able to account for the disparities 
in the understanding of independence by the assurance providers in our sample. For instance, 
the assurance statement of one company does not disclose that the same company also uses 
the assurance provider as a financial auditor. Instead, it contains an extensive declaration of 
complete independence including a reference that no “prohibited services” are provided. In 
contrast to the results for independence, the mean of our proxy for assuror competence is 1.68, 
which is relatively high. The majority of our sample firms use the same assuror from the pre-
vious year, and on average, the statements come close to our completeness benchmark. More-
over, the descriptive statistics on fees reveal that the total costs due to any type of services by 
auditors/assurors are 444 euro per employee and year on average. Similarly, size (original 
values) shows that 73,430 employees work for our sample firms on average during 2011. 
Fin_perf and leverage exhibit substantial heterogeneity with respect to the financial perfor-
mance and capital structure of our sample firms, which results from the variety of industry 
groups contained in our sample. 
Table 7 presents the correlation matrix for our model variables. Our dependent variable AI is 
positively and significantly correlated with provider independence, competence, and clients’ 
fin_perf, which is fully in line with our expectations for these variables. The sign for csp is 
negative but nonsignificant. We are cautious in interpreting this result, as a correlation analy-
sis cannot account for additional factors that may affect the relationship between csp and AI. 
Interestingly, AI is negatively and significantly correlated with fees, which reveals the diffi-
culties that assurors face when promoting new sustainability assurance services in companies 
with substantial existing spending on traditional services. Size is negatively related to ad-
dressee and positively related to competence, which indicates that larger firms are less likely 
to address a broad audience and to choose more competent assurors. The negative correlation 
between size and fees might indicate large clients’ negotiating power that outweighs the in-
creased overall assurance costs arising from their more complex international business. The 
positive correlation between fin_perf and competence may reflect the preferred selection of a 
more competent assuror if a company is financially sound. Intuitively, positive relationships 
also exist between fin_perf and both size and leverage. Overall, the correlation coefficients are 
clearly below 0.4, indicating no multicollinearity problems. 
  
97 
 
Table 7. Correlation statistics 
 
(1) 
AI 
(2) 
csp 
(3) 
addressee 
(4) 
indepen-
dence 
(5) 
compe-
tence 
(6) 
fees 
(7) 
size 
(8) 
fin_perf 
(9) 
leverage 
(1) 1.0000         
          
(2) −0.1400 1.0000        
 (0.1240)         
(3) 0.0291 0.0003 1.0000       
 (0.7502) (0.9975)        
(4) 0.2233 −0.0218 0.0443 1.0000      
 (0.0134) (0.8116) (0.6277)       
(5) 0.1737 0.0473 −0.0143 0.0536 1.0000     
 (0.0557) (0.6050) (0.8759) (0.5577)      
(6) −0.1924 −0.0976 0.0710 0.0162 0.0676 1.0000    
 (0.0338) (0.2851) (0.4370) (0.8591) (0.4593)     
(7) 0.0353 0.0372 −0.1736 −0.1417 0.1690 −0.1519 1.0000   
 (0.6995) (0.6841) (0.0558) (0.1194) (0.0627) (0.0950)    
(8) 0.1546 0.0981 0.0592 −0.0239 0.2462 −0.1068 0.3357 1.0000  
 (0.0892) (0.2825) (0.5175) (0.7938) (0.0063) (0.2418) (0.0002)   
(9) −0.0944 −0.1165 −0.0068 −0.0571 −0.0271 −0.0673 0.0000 0.1838 1.0000 
 (0.3008) (0.2013) (0.9412) (0.5324) (0.7672) (0.4611) (0.9998) (0.0427)  
Table 7 presents bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients and p-values (in parentheses) for a two-tailed test of 
statistical significance for the variables used in the regression analysis. Statistics are presented for the full sample 
of 122 firms. 
Regression analysis 
The results from a multiple regression analysis with AI as the dependent variable are present-
ed in Table 8. We find a negative and highly significant (bcsp = −1.12, p < 0.01, two-tailed) 
relationship between our main variables of interest, csp and AI. This finding supports the ben-
eficial MC hypothesis, which posits a negative relationship between csp and AI. On average, 
poor sustainability performers seek more intensive external assurance services to enhance 
their internal systems, processes, and CSP. These poor sustainability performers benefit the 
most from an intensive assurance engagement because they are more likely to face threatened 
legitimacy and to need to demonstrate the seriousness of their endeavors. Accordingly, supe-
rior sustainability performers on average demand less intensive assurance services owing to 
cost-benefit considerations. Because the sustainability performance of superior sustainability 
performers is already high and because they are thus most likely regarded as legitimate by ex-
ternal stakeholders, these high performers need to neither improve their systems, processes, 
and CSP nor enhance their external credibility. Moreover, highly intensive assurance is not 
currently common practice in most industries, which mitigates intra-industry pressure to catch 
up with industry peers. While our results generally do not exclude the possibility of a detri-
mental form of MC, we find significant evidence for the existence of a beneficial form of MC, 
indicating that firms’ motives and market conditions in 2011 result in positive effects on 
transparency and accountability toward external stakeholders. 
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Table 8. Regression results: main model 
 Expected sign 
detrimental MC 
Expected sign 
beneficial MC Estimates
 
intercept   3.4970*** 
   (4.1154) 
csp + − −1.1197*** 
   (−3.0612) 
addressee + + 0.6690** 
   (2.4589) 
independence + + 0.3577** 
   (2.2447) 
competence + + 0.5792*** 
   (3.4653) 
fees ? ? −0.4750** 
   (−2.3853) 
size ? ? −0.1585 
   (−1.0075) 
fin_perf + + 0.8498*** 
   (3.2320) 
leverage ? ? −0.0220*** 
   (−2.8816) 
assuror dummies   included 
industry dummies   included 
country dummies   included 
observations   122 
adjusted R-squared   0.6206 
F-statistic   6.6561*** 
Table 8 reports ordinary least squares coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) based on Huber-
White robust standard errors. *** and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels (two-tailed). 
We estimate equation (1): 
(1) AI = β0 + β1 csp + β2 addressee + β3 independence + β4 competence + ∑ βii=8i=5  assuror + β9 fees + β10 size 
  + β11 fin_perf + β12 leverage + ∑ βjj=29j=13  industry + ∑ βkk=35k=30  country + . 
The findings regarding our control variables addressee, independence, competence, and 
fin_perf are in line with our expectations, revealing positive effects of the variables on AI. The 
positive sign on addressee implies that firms electing to directly address all stakeholders tend 
to seek more intensive assurance. A possible explanation for this finding is that an assurance 
statement being addressed to a broad audience would call the seriousness and credibility of 
the client firm into question if the corresponding engagement was merely superficial. The 
findings further show that the two provider characteristics independence and competence 
positively influence AI. This finding may indicate that independent and competent assurors 
that have acquired client-specific knowledge presumably possess increased negotiating power 
during the pre-engagement period and that they are thus more likely to convince the client to 
purchase more intensive assurance services (O’Dwyer, 2011; O’Dwyer et al., 2011). Surpris-
ingly, the results show that fees is negatively related to AI. However, one must recall that this 
variable not only captures fees for sustainability assurance services but also includes a firm’s 
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total expenses for any type of audit, audit-related, and other services. Park and Brorson (2005) 
report a rather small proportion of four to six percent for the fees for sustainability assurance 
services relative to the fees related to financial audits. Nevertheless, our results indicate that 
even such a small proportion is important for our sample firms, which is consistent with the 
findings of previous researchers (Kolk & Perego, 2010; Mock et al., 2007; O’Dwyer, 2011; 
Park & Brorson, 2005; Simnett et al., 2009). Presumably, owing to cost-benefit considera-
tions, firms with higher overall expenses relative to their industry peers are less willing to 
spend further funds on voluntary sustainability assurance. The importance of cost-benefit con-
siderations is also reflected by the positive impact of fin_perf. Given both effects, firms on 
average appear to evaluate the benefits of sustainability assurance engagements rather conser-
vatively. This conservatism is relevant for assurance providers because they are more likely to 
negotiate more intensive assurance services if the client’s overall fees are low and financial 
performance is high. Against this background, assurance fees appear to be an important in-
strument during the ongoing crowding-out period in the market for sustainability assurance. 
Further, the negative relationship between leverage and AI indicates that creditors may share 
the conservative view on the financial benefits of intensive sustainability assurance. However, 
the negative coefficient could also result from myopic shareholders who seek to increase their 
return on investment through higher leverage and cost savings. We find no impact of size on 
AI, indicating that public visibility, legitimacy pressure, and negotiating power may not ex-
clusively depend on firm size. In addition, our sample primarily comprises large firms. Final-
ly, consistent with previous findings, we find significant differences (not tabulated) depending 
on a firm’s assuror (Mock et al., 2007; O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005), industry (Cho et al., 2014; 
Simnett et al., 2009), and country (Kolk & Perego, 2010; Ruhnke & Gabriel, 2013; Simnett et 
al., 2009).  
Supplemental analyses 
We perform a number of supplemental analyses to check the robustness of our results. First, 
we use log-transformed market capitalization to proxy for size, we use both return on assets 
and return on equity to proxy for fin_perf, and we winsorize our csp raw data at the 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels (instead of the 10 percent level). The results are similar to those for our 
main model (untabulated). Next, one may argue that our results are primarily driven by poor 
sustainability performers, whereas the nature of MC is different for superior sustainability 
performers. Thus, we divide our sample into poor and superior sustainability performers 
based on the median values within each industry group, and we separately re-estimate the re-
gression for each sub-sample. Our results remain stable for both groups, revealing a highly 
significant negative relationship between csp and AI (untabulated), which indicates the exist-
ence of a beneficial form of MC within both sub-samples. Third, we separately assess the re-
lationship between csp and AI for each dimension of sustainability. To do so, we replace our 
variable csp with a corporate environmental performance variable (cenp) and a corporate so-
cial performance variable (csop). These new variables are calculated as the arithmetic means 
of the winsorized and transformed performance indicators for the respective dimensions. The 
results are reported in Table 9. 
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Table 9. Regression results: environmental and social dimensions 
 Expected sign 
detrimental MC 
Expected sign 
beneficial MC 
Estimates
cenp model 
 Estimates
csop model 
 
intercept   3.1583*** 3.2516*** 
   (3.7126) (3.7143) 
cenp + − −0.5546**  
   (−2.4466)  
csop + −  −0.7916** 
    (−2.5883) 
addressee + + 0.8196*** 0.6514** 
   (3.0359) (2.2139) 
independence + + 0.3744** 0.3518** 
   (2.3274) (2.1253) 
competence + + 0.5617*** 0.4979*** 
   (3.3222) (2.8667) 
fees ? ? −0.5561*** −0.2663 
   (−2.7470) (−1.2949) 
size ? ? −0.1320 −0.1128 
   (−0.8303) (−0.6926) 
fin_perf + + 0.7167*** 0.9576*** 
   (2.7088) (3.4826) 
leverage ? ? −0.0237*** −0.0205** 
   (−3.0792) (−2.5948) 
assuror dummies   included included 
industry dummies   included included 
country dummies   included included 
observations   122 122 
adjusted R-squared   0.6108 0.6090 
F-statistic   6.4257*** 6.3853*** 
Table 9 reports ordinary least squares coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) based on Huber-
White robust standard errors. *** and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels (two-tailed). 
We estimate equations (2) and (3): 
(2) AI = β0 + β1 cenp + β2 addressee + β3 independence + β4 competence + ∑ βii=8i=5  assuror + β9 fees + β10 size 
+ β11 fin_perf + β12 leverage + ∑ βjj=29j=13  industry + ∑ βkk=35k=30  country +  
(3) AI = β0 + β1 csop + β2 addressee + β3 independence + β4 competence + ∑ βii=8i=5  assuror + β9 fees + β10 size 
  + β11 fin_perf + β12 leverage + ∑ βjj=29j=13  industry + ∑ βkk=35k=30  country + . 
Although this approach limits the variation in our data, it allows us to separately test the ap-
plicability of our reasoning for each dimension. Both environmental performance and social 
performance appear to be important for our sample firms, as we obtain negative and signifi-
cant signs for cenp and csop. These results are consistent with those of our main model, 
providing additional support for the existence of a beneficial form of MC. Finally, we investi-
gate the problem of selection bias due to missing data for certain sustainability performance 
indicators. Similar to Hummel and Schlick (2014), we use the Monte Carlo simulation meth-
od developed by Metropolis and Ulam (1949) to simulate the outcome of our regression mod-
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el if performance data were complete.11 Every missing raw performance value is replaced 
with a simulated value that is randomly drawn from the continuous interval [0.8*minimum 
per industry; 1.2*maximum per industry]. The resulting complete performance dataset con-
tains both true and simulated performance values. Then, we re-estimate our main regression 
model and obtain the estimates for the coefficient on csp along with the corresponding p-
values. Figure 1 depicts a scatter plot of both values after the simulation is repeated 100,000 
times with new randomly filled missing values in every run. 
Figure 1: Results from Monte Carlo simulation of csp coefficient 
Figure 1 presents Monte Carlo simulation results to validate the robustness of our main regression model results 
to the simulation of missing data for certain sustainability performance indicators. Each mark represents a simu-
lated regression coefficient along with the corresponding p-value. All marks below the broken line refer to statis-
tically significant results at least at the 10% level (two-tailed). 
The results regarding the existence of a beneficial form of MC are robust to the simulation of 
missing performance values, as the Monte Carlo simulation reveals generally significant 
negative values for the simulated coefficients on csp. Specifically, 54.29 percent of the coeffi-
cients are statistically significant at the 1 percent level, 42.83 percent are significant at the 5 
percent level, 2.68 percent are significant at the 10 percent level, and 0.21 percent are nonsig-
nificant. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper empirically investigates the nature of MC in sustainability assurance engagements. 
Previous research presents a predominantly critical picture of sustainability assurance as a 
process that is captured by the management of a company to advance its corporate image at 
the expense of accountability and transparency toward external stakeholders. Based on con-
tent analyses of assurance statements, such research often interprets the lack of transparency, 
accountability, and stakeholder inclusivity as evidence of the existence of a detrimental form 
of MC. Recent qualitative research based on interviews and case studies attenuates this criti-
cal picture and describes assurance providers as independent, competent, and highly commit-
                                                 
11 Firms must provide data on at least two performance indicators for both the environmental and social dimen-
sions of sustainability (see Table 4) to qualify for our sample. 
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ted to accountability. Against the background of these ambiguous findings, we propose a 
broader and more neutral understanding of MC as a client’s influence on the process and out-
come of assurance engagements. Accordingly, we hypothesize that MC can affect assurance 
engagements in a detrimental or beneficial way with respect to transparency and accountabil-
ity toward external stakeholders. We assess the nature of MC by investigating the relationship 
between the intensity of voluntarily requested sustainability assurance services and the cli-
ent’s CSP. 
Drawing on a sample of 122 European companies, we observe a heterogeneous picture of AI, 
ranging from low-intensity to high-intensity assurance engagements. Although intensive sus-
tainability assurance services are not currently common practice in most industries, the gen-
eral perception of sustainability assurance as a detrimental, window-dressing activity is not 
supported by our findings. In particular, we find that AI is negatively related to CSP, indicat-
ing the existence of a beneficial form of MC. Poor sustainability performers on average de-
mand more intensive assurance services to enhance their credibility toward external stake-
holders, and the assurance process helps to improve their internal systems, processes, and 
CSP to close existing or impending legitimacy gaps. On the other hand, superior sustainability 
performers are already perceived as legitimate by their stakeholders, and they demand less-
intensive assurance services owing to cost-benefit considerations. 
Additionally, our study sheds light on other determinants of AI. Although the mechanisms 
could differ because of the voluntary nature of sustainability assurance engagements, our re-
sults corroborate related findings in the audit literature. An assuror’s independence and com-
petence appear to positively affect AI, as the position of the assuror during pre-engagement 
negotiations is strengthened and as client-specific knowledge helps to determine appropriate 
arguments to justify the costs of additional assurance services. Accordingly, relatively high 
client expenses on overall audit, assurance, and additional services are found to hamper AI, 
whereas sound financial performance positively affects the intensity of requested services. 
This picture is also consistent with current developments in the market for sustainability as-
surance, reflecting an ongoing crowding-out of smaller providers. Major accountancy firms 
benefit from their reputation as established financial auditors, and they may cross-sell sustain-
ability assurance at competitive rates during this stage of the market. In line with previous re-
search, we also find that the demand for assurance services differs depending on companies’ 
industry and country of domicile. 
Our findings and conclusions are moderated by certain limitations. First, the sample is re-
stricted to large listed companies in 2011; thus, we cannot account for other companies that 
may receive less public attention and pursue different legitimization strategies. In addition, 
companies are excluded because of unavailable assurance statements or insufficient sustaina-
bility performance data. Second, data collection on AI relies on information contained in sus-
tainability assurance statements, and this information is assumed to be true and complete. 
Although common assurance standards in 2011 provide guidance on assurance statement ele-
ments, latitude for interpretation and discretionary decisions by the assurors and their clients 
remains. 
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Finally, our investigation of the nature of MC in sustainability assurance engagements pro-
vides various opportunities for future research. In light of the revised ISAE 3000 standard that 
will be effective from the end of 2015 and in light of the ongoing developments in the market 
for sustainability assurance, researchers could analyze whether the major accountancy firms 
further strengthen their position and how assurance services are affected. In addition, our 
measure of AI could be applied to examine the effectiveness of forthcoming mandatory re-
quirements. Such external shocks provide a setting for differences-in-differences analyses 
over time and for mandatory versus non-mandatory countries. Regarding the nature of MC, 
future research could investigate how regulation affects detrimental MC and whether benefi-
cial MC diminishes because firms may refer to some legally required level of AI. 
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